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Introduction 
The core assumption of this thesis stems from the argumentation of Colin Sparks that through the
optic  of  media,  “certain features  of  the  structure of  society”  are  more clearly illuminated than
through others.1 As the contemporary societies are highly mediated, it makes sense to presume that
the transformation of the media points to a broader political change.2 Taking this correlation into
consideration, it is expected that the media in transitional societies obtains a special significance, as
the  turbulence  of  the  transition  phase  evokes  both  elevated  public  interest  and  reflects  the
uncertainness of the times. For that reason, two countries that at first glance appear to have little in
common,  have  been  chosen  for  examination.  Estonia  and  Chile  went  through  transition  from
authoritarian regime to democracy almost simultaneously, adding a curious parallel of the same
global trends affecting the processes of political change. 
Estonia regained its independence in 1991, while the dictatorship in Chile officially ended in
1990. In both countries, the transition lasted throughout the 1990s. In the case of Estonia, it  is
possible to speak of the transition process ending around 2000, while in the case of Chile, it has
been argued that the transition is not yet over.3 The Chilean constitution of 1980, designed and
adopted under the dictatorship, is in effect to this day. This thesis begins with an overview of the
developments in late 1980s, and finishes with the first few years of 2000s. As the primary focus of
this  thesis  is  on  the  media,  the  end  point  to  the  analysis  has  been  chosen  according  to  the
significance of the  developments in media sphere. The Press Law of 2001 in Chile bettered the
situation of media freedom, while in Estonia, the implementation of EU legislation regarding audio-
visual media in 1999/2000 marked an important unification with European media systems. 
Chile and Estonia were strongly influenced by the prevalent tendencies in the world at the
time, that is, the dispersion of democracy and capitalism. For different reasons, both countries opted
for maximum liberalisation in economic terms, which in turn had a great impact on social  and
political developments. It is argued in this thesis that due to the shared economic approach chosen
by Estonia and Chile, the processes of media developments have been, to an extent, similar as well.
Surprisingly, the institution of democracy has not necessarily led to a pluralistic media system –
1 Karol Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening: Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe (New Jersey: 
Hampton Press Inc., 2007), 1 
2 Ibid., 1
3 Antonio Castillo, “The media in the Chilean Transition to Democracy: Context, Process and Evaluation (1990-
2000)” (PhD diss., University of Western Sydney, 2006), 3 
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while  the  number  of  media  outlets  has  steadily  increased,  the  trends  in  content  have  rather
developed towards congruity. In both Estonia and Chile, the commercialisation and tabloidisation of
the media constituted the prevalent processes in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is hereby understood that
the media has a role of public service in a democratic society, which the developments towards
entertainment orientation do not necessarily support. This thesis seeks to explain why the media
plurality  as  reflected  in  the  diversity  of  content  seems  to  decline  as  the  neoliberal  transition
advances,  even  though  the  objective  in  a  democracy naturally  constitutes  a  democratic  media
system. 
While  there  are  various  ways  to  define  the  media  – depending on the  definition  it  can
comprise anything from simple leaflets to arts production – the media forms under consideration in
this thesis are newspapers, to a smaller extent magazines, and television. The reason for this choice
is related to the main theory used throughout this thesis for conceptualising the media. Relying on
the public sphere theory of Jürgen Habermas, the media is understood as an institution of the public
sphere, pointing to the central elements of participation, deliberation, and political communication.
Considering that the objective in this thesis is to understand media's role during the transition as a
period of rapid political  change,  and the subsequent deficiencies in  the development  towards a
democratic media system, the media is primarily understood as the sphere between the political and
the social, the public and the private. That is to say, the relevance of the media during the transition
process lies in its role as the political and social communication institution. Newspapers, analytical
magazines, and television have proven as the main channels used for this purpose. 
In order to reach the given end, the thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter seeks to
set  the  general  framework  of  how the  transition  process  is  understood,  what  are  the  possible
approaches to the relation of the media and democracy, and why does the neoliberal nature of the
transition process matter from the perspective of media development. The second chapter outlines
the general developments and tendencies of the media system in Estonia, beginning with the final
years of the Soviet rule and focusing section by section on the printed press and the television. The
third  chapter  focuses  on  Chile,  and  broadly  follows  the  structure  of  the  second  chapter,  but
additionally includes some further peculiarities of Chilean media culture in the last section. The
fourth and final chapter attempts to bring the two and two together, and examine the similarities and
differences of the Estonian and Chilean media development under the government of democratic
authorities. General conclusions are reached in the final chapter. 
A  case  study  of  Estonian  and  Chilean  media  developments  during  the  transition  to
democracy  in  comparative  perspective  has  not  been  conducted  before,  but  the  thesis  makes
extensive use of works of authors who have studied the media developments in these countries
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separately. First of all, as an introductory volume to the relations of media and democracy, Peter
Dahglren's analysis of the issues with political participation in a contemporary society, including the
effect  of  market  forces,  has  proven  very useful  for  understanding  the  broader  socio-economic
context.4 Considering the centrality of the effects of the market on the development of democratic
media,  Adam  Przeworski's  study  of  economic  reform  and  affluence  affecting  transitional
democracies is greatly relied upon.5 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have conducted
extensive  research  on  the  countries  going  through  transition  as  part  of  the  third  wave  of
democratisation, and have identified the recurring features and sub-processes in these countries.6 In
joint  with  Gerardo  Munck  and  Carol  Leff's  analysis  of  the  primary  actors  and  strategies  of
transition,7 this work benefited for better apprehension of the nature of the transition itself.
Concerning media system developments, Karol Jakubowicz has analysed the peculiarities of
post-socialist countries, identifying similarities and underlining differences deriving from specific
cultural, economic, and political variables.8 Jakubowicz, as well as the Estonian authors most relied
upon – Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm, and Epp Lauk, are all concerned with the democratic
qualities  of  the  media  system,  which  broadly relate  to  the  Habermasian  concept  of  the  public
sphere. Compiled or contributed to by the named Estonian authors, two books –  Baltic Media in
Transition and Return to the Western World – are used as the framework for understanding Estonian
media  processes,  as  they  address  the  media  and  the  political  developments  advancing  jointly.9
Rosalind  Bresnahan's  critical  approach  to  Chile's  post-authoritarian  media  developments  offers
perspectives  on  both  the  broader  context  of  neoliberal  transition  and  the  media,  as  well  as
conditions  specific  to  Chile.10 The biggest  contribution to  the understanding of  both the media
system and the social and political developments in Chile during the transition period has been
Antonio Castillo's doctoral thesis on Chilean media in transition to democracy.11 
4 Peter Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication, and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009)
5 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economid Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America (New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
6 Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991)
7 Gerardo L. Munck, Carol S. Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratisation: South America and Eastern Europe in
Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 29 (1997)
8 Karol Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening
9 ed. Marju Lauristin et al., Return to the Western World (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997) / ed. Peeter Vihalemm, 
Baltic Media in Transition (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2002)
10 Rosalind Bresnahan, “The Media and the Neoliberal Transition in Chile: Democratic Promise Unfulfilled,” Latin 
American Perspectives 6 (2003):
11 Antonio Castillo, “The media in the Chilean Transition to Democracy: Context, Process and Evaluation (1990-
2000)” (PhD diss., University of Western Sydney, 2006)
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1. Theoretical Framework
This chapter constructs the general theoretical  framework used in this  thesis.  It  begins  with an
introduction  to  the  concept  of  democratic  transition  and  will  explain  the  main  features  of  the
process. A few possible academic approaches to the transition will be outlined, and the main method
of conceptualising  these changes,  relying  on the works  of  noted scholars,  will  be drafted.  The
neoliberal character of the transition process, as experienced by Estonia and Chile, will be sketched.
The next section focuses on the connections of the media and democracy, and briefly addresses
some of the theories regarding the media’s role in a democratic society. The main approach used in
this thesis will be explained in more detail. The last section addresses the media in the context of
the peculiarities of neoliberal transition, and will seek to understand the main pitfalls of the media
in fulfilling its role, as conceptualised in the second section, within the context of neoliberalism. 
1.1 Transition 
Since the mid-1970s, two global trends – the spread of democracy and capitalism – have constituted
a larger process, which Samuel Huntington, for its “unprecedented geographical reach,” has named
the third wave of democratisation.12 The democratic transition process has taken place in numerous
countries  across  Latin  America,  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  and  the  multiple  case  studies  have
confirmed the pattern of democratic and neoliberal economic reforms to be a sign of a common
vision of economic and political development dispersing worldwide. Estonia and Chile fit right into
this  mould,  and the transition as a shared feature gives ground to comparative analysis  of two
otherwise  distinctively  different  countries.  This  section  will  seek  to  clarify  how  the  transition
process is understood in the context of this thesis, and why it is important to examine the transition
in the first place.
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter broadly define the transition process as “the
interval between one political regime and another,” which is “delimited, on the one side, by the
launching process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and, on the other, by the installation of
some form of democracy.”13 Transition takes place on multiple levels, and in cases such as the post-
socialist  countries  in  which  the  previous  regime  had  attempted  to  build  from  scratch  an  all-
encompassing order according to certain ideological principles, transitions to democracy require
12 Valerie Bunce, “Democratisation and Economic Reform,” Annual Reviews of Political Science 4 (2001): 43-44
13 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6 
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thorough “systemic changes”.14 This falls in line with Claus Offe's theory of “triple transformation”,
by which he means that during the transition, both national-territorial and constitutional issues as
well as a complete restructuring of the economic system may have to be dealt with.15 In addition,
Marju Lauristin points out that “the most important systemic aspects of these processes are related
to  democratisation  and  marketisation.”16 Following  these  principles,  the  transition  is  hereby
understood as the interim period between two political orders, during which systemic reforms on
institutional,  economical,  and  social  level  are  conducted,  with  the  objective  of  instituting  a
democratic order and a market economy.
A guiding theme in this thesis is the neoliberal principles according to which the transitions
in both Estonia and Chile were followed through. As Karol Jakubowicz has pointed out, all post-
socialist countries shared the two goals of consolidated democracy and an economic reform.17 In
Chile, the neoliberal economic approach had already been implied under the dictatorship, but the
importance of it in the context of this thesis lies in the decision to stay true to these principles
throughout the transition. In Estonia, similar neoliberal objectives were opted for after the collapse
of the previous regime.18 These policies which both Estonia and Chile followed are in accordance
with the Washington Consensus, which is based on the principles of “liberalisation of markets,
privatisation, deregulation and macroeconomic stabilisation.”19 Grzegorz Kolodko has summarised
these policies as follows: “liberalise as much as you can, privatise as fast as you can, and be tough
in fiscal and monetary measures.”20 The examination of the role of media in Estonian and Chilean
transitions are understood as being heavily influenced by neoliberal thought. 
The importance of the transition and transformation processes from an authoritarian regime
to democracy lies in their uncertainty. Even though the desired outcome for the groups pushing for
change might be a democratic system, such objectives are not always achieved as the first phases of
the transition process are by no means irreversible. The initial liberalisation of a regime may be
revoked and an even harsher regime imposed instead of the previous one, or the elite of the old
regime might be powerful enough to dictate the course of the transition, and lead to an outcome of
some  form of  authoritarian  rule  with  limited  liberties  or  an  unconsolidated  democracy with  a
considerable degree  of restrictions. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, it  is a period during
14 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 60 
15 Ibid., 55-56 
16 Marju Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” in Return to the Western World, ed. Marju Lauristin (Tartu: Tartu 
University press, 1997), 27 
17 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 116 
18 Dorothee Bohle and Bela Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, (Cornell: Cornell University 
press, 2012)
19 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened? ed. John Williamson (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics), 7-20  
20 Bunce, “Democratisation and Economic Reform,” 44 
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which “the rules of the political game are not defined”, and all parties struggle to satisfy their own
needs, as well as set the rules for the future.21 Gerardo Munck and Carol Leff claim that transitions
“set a society on a path that shapes its subsequent political development,”22 which explains why it is
important  to  consider  how  the  democratisation  process  is  conducted  and  how  the  uncertainty
inherent to transitions is dealt with.
What is meant by the path-setting effect of the nature of the transition process is that it
affects the pattern of later elite competition, the subsequent institutional rules are crafted during this
time and whether the key actors are inclined to reject or accept “the new rules of the game”.23 In
short,  understanding  the  democratisation  process  will  help  to  determine  whether  the  following
democratic  and  economic  system  is  viable  and  institutionally  equipped  to  manage  the  elite
competition.24 According to the transitology theory, the character of the transition process depends
on three factors: “the starting point of the process of democratisation, the agents of democratisation
and the objectives established.”25 In addition, Munck and Leff stress the strategies employed by the
agents of democratisation as an important factor as well26 – that is, whether the regime change is a
result of negotiation between old elites and counter-elites or one of them has an upper hand in the
process. Furthermore, the transition process is also affected by the chosen reform strategy: whether
the  “bitter  pill”  of  quick  but  socially  costly  or  a  more  gradual  but  potentially  long-lasting,
ineffective and discontent causing reform dynamic is opted for.27
The transition itself has been roughly categorised into three phases: the breakdown of the
old  regime,  the  democratic  transition,  and  democratic  consolidation.28 Focusing  on  the  pre-
consolidation phase, O'Donnell and Schmitter see the transition as three sub-processes jointly in
action:  liberalisation,  democratisation,  and  socialisation.29 These  are  the  main  categorisation
guidelines followed in this thesis.  There are other possible distinctions to be made such as the
institution-  and  the  culture-building  dimensions  proposed  by  Piotr  Stompka,30 or  a  substantial
differentiation  of  transition  and  transformation,  which  Raivo  Vetik  has  described  as  concepts
representing “two different dimensions of democratization and development phases”, the first of
which concerns the formal rules and institutions of democracy, the latter the much more elusive
21 O'Donnell, Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6 
22  Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratisation,” 343
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., 344 
25 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 130-131
26 Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition,” 343
27 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 147 
28 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 130
29 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 7-12
30 Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” 27 
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process of social change and the development of democratic political culture.31 However, as the
focus of this thesis is on the transition phase, the democratic consolidation and subsequent social
transformation will not be addressed. 
It  is  hereby  understood  that  the  breakdown  of  the  old  regime,  which  kick-starts  the
transition, begins with a liberalisation process in the society. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter,
“the authoritarian incumbents,  for whatever  reason, begin to  modify their  own rules”32 and the
liberalisation manifests itself as “the process of redefining and extending rights”, including freedom
of speech and the right to associate.33 The following phase, which may overlap with the democratic
transition  (if  democracy  is  the  objective  and  a  realistic  outcome),  constitutes  democratisation,
characterised by “the rules and procedures of citizenship” being “applied to political institutions
previously governed by other principles.”34 This is also understood as the institution-building phase,
during which the fundamental economic restructuring, if necessary, takes place as well. The third
phase  constitutes  consolidation,  which  partially  overlaps  with  O'Donnell's  and  Schmitter's
“socialisation” - the “double stream” process of equalising all citizens in their rights and obligations
(“social democracy”), and providing the citizenry equal benefits in terms of goods and services
(“economic democracy”).35
The question of when is the transition over is another issue that must be touched upon.
Adam Przeworski claims that “democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic
conditions a  particular  system of institutions becomes the only game in town.”36 He speaks  of
uncertainty as  a  quintessential  feature  of  democracy,  as  due to  the institutional  design  and the
centrality of competition, there will always be sporadic winners and losers in a democratic system.37
He believes  that  a  democracy  is  consolidated  when  all  parties  navigate  by  default  within  the
institutional framework and know that they stand a fair chance of pursuing their interests in the
future, if they wait and respect the institutional design set in place, even if they are temporarily in a
disadvantaged position. In sum, democracy in this situation becomes “self-enforcing”38 and evokes
“generalised compliance.”39 
31 Raivo Vetik, “Sissejuhatus,” Eesti poliitika ja valitsemine 1991-2011, ed. Raivo Vetik (Tallinn: TLÜ Kirjastus, 
2012), 8 
32 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions of Authoritarian Rule, 6
33 Ibid., 7 
34 Ibid., 8
35 Ibid., 12
36 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 26 
37 Ibid., 11 
38 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 26
39 Ibid., 30
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Offe  sees  a  consolidated  system  in  decisions  being  taken  “'within'  fixed  and  settled
procedures, not 'about' them,”40 which also points to the universal acceptance of the institutional
design in  place.  Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have come up with “five arenas  of  consolidated
democracy”: civil society (freedom of association and communication), political society (free and
inclusive  elections),  rule  of  law  (constitutionalism),  state  apparatus  (rational-legal  bureaucratic
norms), and economic society (institutionalised market).41 In addition, Przeworski argues that for
democratic institutions to be consolidated, they must “at the same time protect all interests and
generate economic results.” In his opinion, the stability of a new democracy depends greatly on its
economy.42 
To briefly touch up on the question of when is transformation over (as defined by Vetik),
Marju Lauristin points out that there is a “discrepancy between the speed of institutional reforms
and the slowness of cultural changes”,43 and Jakubowicz argues that social transformation can never
truly be “over”.44 The consolidation of democracy in this thesis is first and foremost understood as
having been reached when requirements of five arenas of consolidated democracy proposed by Linz
and Stepan have been fulfilled. According to Antonio Castillo, there is a “link between the quality
of political communication and the quality of democracy.”45 Following this thought, it can perhaps
be  argued  that  the  performance  of  the  media,  as  an  institution  of  communication,  can  be
conceptualised as a sort of a litmus test for the democratisation and social transformation processes.
Freedom of press in relation to freedom of speech form an important pillar  of democracy,  and
arguably speak something of the health of the entire system. Different options of how the media can
be understood as reflecting the larger societal and political processes, will be explored subsequently.
1.2 Media and Democracy 
This section focuses on the different theories concerning media's role in democracy, and sketches
the framework of the main approach used throughout the thesis. The concept central to democracy
is that of citizenship and citizenry, as democracy in its ideal form should be “government of the
people, by the people, for the people.”46 By definition, civic participation of some sort is required in
a democratically governed state, since the will of the people is central to democracy, “as expressed
40 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 80 
41 Ibid., 27 
42 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 188 
43 Lauristin, “Contexts of Transition,” 27 
44 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 51 
45 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 163 
46 “Gettysburg Address,” accessed March 31, 2017, 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm
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through representation, consent, and participation.”47 The degree and form of engagement, however,
varies  greatly  between  societies,  depending,  among  other  factors,  on  the  specific  model  of
democracy at work in a given society. However, as Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt have argued,
some form of  mediated communication  is  necessary even in  elite  forms of  democracy,  for  the
consent of the populace is required.48
Communication is one of the key requirements for a properly functioning democracy, and
the task of mediation in contemporary society lies first and foremost with the media in its many
forms. As Patrik H. O'Neil explains, the media provides necessary access to information for civil
society, which enables informed political choice-making and the politicians require media “as a way
in which they can take stock of the public mood, present their views, and interact with society.”49
Some media theories also emphasise the role of media as the fourth estate, according to which the
media  should  critically  assess  state  action  and  convey relevant  information  to  the  public.50 In
O'Neil's opinion, shared by many others, the media is a “vital conduit of relations between state and
society.”51 However, as Peter Dahlgren points out, “the media are a prerequisite – though by no
means  a  guarantee  –  for  shaping  the  democratic  character  of  society”,52 just  as  simply  the
occurrence of elections does not make a political system democratic. 
Although the media can be considered a “major historical force,”53 it is important to note
that the media are instruments of social forces, not primary social actors themselves.54 Thus, the
collective frames of reference and knowledge taking form within the media are a result of agendas
of various interrelated social actors. Furthermore, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw have said
that “the media can influence which issues are salient in the public consciousness” and Bernard
Cohen has pointed out that “the media might not tell the audience what to think, but they do tell
them what to think about”.55 Even though the broader vision of media's role in democracy is more
or less agreed upon, such as voiced by O'Neil, the debate on the specifics of what does the media
practically do in a society,  or rather,  what it  ought to be doing, has led to the development of
numerous media and communication theories. Similarly, the discussion on how should the media
47 Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt, “The Mass Media, Democracy, and the Public Sphere,” in Talk on Television: 
Audience Participation and Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 1994), 3 
48 Ibid., 4 
49 Patrick H. O'Neil, “Democratisation and Mass Communication: What Is the Link?” in Communicating Democracy, 
ed. Patrick H. O'Neil (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 1
50 Ibid., 2
51 Ibid.
52 Dahlgren, Media and Political Engagement, 2 
53 Dahglren, Media and Political Engagement, 3
54 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 6 
55 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 224 
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achieve these objectives, whatever they be, is by no means a closed chapter. Some of the theoretical
considerations are hereby addressed. 
One of the common media theories seeking to explain media and society relations is the
Four Theories of the Press, developed by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm. It
consists of four paradigms – the authoritarian theory (the press serves the government), the soviet
theory (the government runs the press), the libertarian theory (the press exists as an independent
institution), and the social responsibility theory (the press is independent but has a responsibility to
serve public  interest).56 An alternative approach has been proposed by Dennis McQuail,  Kaarle
Nordenstreng, Clifford G. Christians, and Robert A. White, which consists of five paradigms: the
liberal-individualist,  the  social  responsibility,  the  critical,  the  administrative,  and  the  cultural
negotiation model.  Daniel Hallin  and Paolo Mancini  have sketched three models of media and
society arrangements: a liberal model with no state intervention and the media is regulated by the
market;  democratic-corporatist  model  with  a  mixture  of  commercial  and interest  group related
media; and the polarised pluralist model, in which the media serves political interests.57  
Peter Dahlgren speaks of three traditions of media and democracy relations: the political
communication  theory  deriving  from  political  science,  the  “culturalist”  approach  and  the
Habermasian public sphere tradition.58 The political communication model assumes that the politics
is played out in the interaction of the political institutions and actors, the media, and the citizens.
The second is the so-called “culturalist” approach, which offers “perspectives on themes such as
meaning, identity,  and practices, highlighting the idea of sense-making agents.”59 The important
themes in the third, the public sphere tradition, postulated by Jürgen Habermas, are “communicative
reality, deliberative democracy, and civil society.”60 The strengths of this approach, as articulated by
Dahlgren,  are  the  critical  approach  to  institutional  arrangements,  including  the  media,  and
“constellations of power and patterns of communication that can support or hinder democracy.”
From a  critical  perspective,  he  draws  attention  to  the  relative  ignorance  of  “the  socio-cultural
circumstances of the citizens” of the public sphere theory.61
In this thesis, the public sphere tradition of Jürgen Habermas is used as the main theoretical
framework. Following Rosalind Bresnahan's analysis, the Habermasian public sphere concept is
central to recent democratic media theory and the media is increasingly becoming “the primary
56 Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana, Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 1963)
57 “Normative Media Theory.” Accessed April 5, 2017. 
http://www.le.ac.uk/oerresources/media/ms7501/mod2unit11/page_07.htm
58 Dahglren, Media and Political Engagement, 4
59 Ibid., 5 
60 Dahglren, Media and Political Engagement, 5 
61 Ibid., 4
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arena  of  the  public  sphere.”62 Habermas  defines  the  bourgeois  public  sphere  as  “the  sphere  of
private people come together as a public,”63 thus forming a “social space for the expression of the
demands and concerns of the civil society.”64 Next to the State and the market, the public sphere is
imagined as a kind of a third space, where free association and discussion is possible.65 The public
sphere  should be equally accessible  to  anyone interested  in  participating  in  the  rational-critical
debate. In theory, the public opinion would form as a result of this debate, the best argument would
prevail and political decision-making would be based on it. The development of public opinion in
an open debate form “limits the incursion of bureaucratic and political control into everyday life.” 66
In its inclusiveness, the public sphere as described by Habermas has the potential to serve as a
powerful democratic resource. 
The public sphere is “comprised of the institutional communicative spaces”,67 among which,
according to Habermas, the press is the principal institution.68 He has described the development of
the bourgeois public sphere being closely linked to the emerging press, which turned from “mere
institutions  for  the  publication  of  news”  into  “carriers  and  leaders  of  public  opinion,  and
instruments in the arsenal of party politics” – this process is characterised by the emergence of the
editorial function between gathering and publishing of the news.69 It can be argued that this change
begun the development of the press into the mediating space between state and society. Looking at
the  contemporary  society,  however,  Habermas  has  expressed  the  conviction  that  “the  world
fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only,” as the public sphere has been
“refeudalised” by interests other than the public good. He thinks that the potential of media remains
unfulfilled  in  current  conditions,70 due  to  party  politics,  media  manipulation  and  commercial
interests, and as a result “representation and appearances outweigh rational debate”.71 Despite these
arguments, what is to be taken from this theory is that there is a version of the workings of the
media  in  which  it  can  serve  as  a  democratic  public  sphere  institution,  even if  not  necessarily
actualised in current conditions. 
Habermasian approach is not without its critics, however. Some authors have argued that the
bourgeois  public  sphere  is  a  historical  fiction  and has  never  existed  in  its  idealistic  form.  For
62 Bresnahan, “The Media and the Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 41
63 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into  a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994),  27 
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65 Jakubowicz, Rude Awakening, 32 
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67 Dahglren, Media and Political Engagement, 72 
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69 Ibid., 182
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example,  Wolfgang  Jäger  claims  that  even  in  the  peak  period  of  bourgeois  public  sphere  as
imagined by Habermas, public opinion was still serving economic interests.72 Questions have been
raised about the bourgeois public sphere's exclusiveness – Mary Ryan notes sardonically that “not
only did Habermas neglect women's public spheres,  but marks the decline of the public sphere
precisely at the moment when women were beginning to get political power and become actors.”73
Working class and the disadvantaged in society have been marginalised as well. Douglas Kellner
has found that Habermas does not acknowledge the potential  of new communication media for
educational and organisational purposes in his conviction that the mass media is not living up to the
public sphere potential.74 These demurs have been duly noted and considered, and will be attempted
to cautiously conciliate with the public sphere model implied to the media in the democratisation
process.
It  can  be  argued  that  under  hostile  conditions  of  an  authoritarian  rule,  under  which  no
meaningful participation in official institutions is possible and regime-critical thought is oppressed,
alternative  or  unofficial  media  has  the  potential  to  reinvigorate  the  ideals  of  honest  civic
participation and develop,  if  the conditions  permit,  in  the direction  of  embodying some of  the
public sphere ideals proposed by Habermas. If resistance to an unwanted regime starts with a sense
of identity of a fragment of the society consciously, and actively, differentiating themselves from
the  identity  forced  on  the  populace  from  the  top  down,  and  if  this  identity  develops  into  a
purposeful civic agency, it can perhaps be argued that this agency will start to manifest itself in the
only available public sphere institution – the media. In cases such as Chile, a viable alternative
media flourished under the dictatorship, while in Estonia, the official media itself became the arena
of public discussion once the censorship eased. As the notion of media furthering civic agency is
supported both by the experience of  Estonia and Chile,  the analysis  of  the media's  role  in  the
democratisation process in this thesis treats the media as a potential public sphere institution in
Habermasian sense. The media in the context of neoliberal transition is the topic of the next section.
1.3 Media and Neoliberal Transition
As Przeworski has argued, the authoritarian regimes perceive dangerous “not the breakdown of
legitimacy but the organisation of counter-hegemony.” The “collective projects for an alternative
72 Peter U. Hohendal, “Critical Theory, Public Sphere, and Culture: Jürgen Habermas and His Critics,” in The 
Institution of Criticism (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 251
73 Douglas Kellner, “Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,” in Perspectives on 
Habermas, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 2000), 265
74 Ibid., 280
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future”, he explains, are the real reason why the authorities are afraid of words – “even if these
words convey what everyone knows anyway, for it its the fact of uttering them, not their content,
that has the mobilising potential.”75 He shrewdly remarks that “once the king is announced to be
naked,  the  equilibrium  is  destroyed  instantaneously.”76 Owen  Johnson,  further  underlining  the
importance of expressiveness, has made an interesting observation that many early leaders of the
post-Communist governments were journalists and writers, such as Czechoslovak President Vaclac
Havel and the Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowicki;77 so was Estonia's President Lennart Meri.
While there exists an extensive literature affirming the connection between social change and mass
communications, Karol Jakubowicz observes that there is no unanimity as to the specifics of this
relationship,78 and claims that the issue of whether the media leads the social change or tails close
behind it resembles “the chicken-or-egg question.”79 However, neoliberal principles of the transition
give the media a distinctive character, which is hereby analysed. 
It would make sense to assume that the media, having valiantly fought for the freedom of
speech and press during the liberalisation phase, would simply begin operating according to the
democratic  values  and  principles,  once  the  barriers  of  censorship  and  fear  have  collapsed.
Ostensibly at liberty to finally print and broadcast without ideological constraint, the media could
be expected to naturally become, or rather, to continue their role as the “agent for democracy”.80 In
accordance with the theory of media as the public sphere, Antonio Castillo has argued that the role
of journalism in the transition process is to reintroduce citizens to the newly democratic system,
underlining  the  importance  of  not  only  disseminating  information  but  also  providing  civic
education.  The  democratic  media  should  “promote  an  informed  citizenry,  public  debate,  and
reasoning.”81 Failure to meet these criteria undermines the foundation of the new democracy.82 This
approach, then, “conceptualises the media user above all as a citizen.”83 
The  market  model,  however,  implanted  according  to  the  neoliberal  principles  of
privatisation, market competition and profit orientation, force the media outlets into a tough contest
for advertising revenues. As attracting readership and upping audience ratings become the main
objectives for the media organisations, for their livelihood depends on them, the media content is
altered to  cater  the masses.  Robert  McChesney explains  that  this  model  of media generates “a
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passive, depoliticised populace”84 that “seeks privatised satisfaction in personal consumption rather
than pursuing fundamental social change, which is portrayed as neither possible nor desirable.”85
Civic education and public debate start to lose importance in the media coverage, as the competition
for advertising revenues overrides all  other objectives. As Bresnahan has put it,  the “neoliberal
theory  reduces  citizens  to  consumers  and  media  democratisation  to  the  expansion  of  market
choices.”86 This, in turn, creates the paradox of “rich media, poor democracy”87 and the problem of
“informed elites” versus “entertained majorities”: a wide array of media outlets are available, but
the content differs little; the meaning of  “the public” changes from an active citizenship to “media
spectatorship”.88 
The supporters of the neoliberal approach argue that the media plurality – the multiplicity of
media outlets according to this viewpoint in itself points to a democratic character of the media – is
best  served  through  the  market  competition.  Eugeoni  Tironi,  director  of  the  Secretariat  of
Communication and Culture in the Aylwin administration, justified the market-driven, commercial
media model as democratic because the media organisations as profit-seeking businesses “must
satisfy the needs  of  advertisers  who,  in  turn,  respond to  audience preferences.”89 If  it  is  to  be
believed, as Przeworski has claimed, that “the only practicable mechanism we know today by which
people can inform each other about their needs and their capacities is the price mechanism,”90 it
could  also  be  argued  that  radical  ideology has  no  place  in  the  neoliberal  marketplace,  as  the
majority preference would clearly indicate lack of demand for it. This, in turn, makes a solid case
for the neoliberal approach in the eyes of the populaces recently emancipated from authoritarian
rule, with a distaste for anything associated with state intervention. 
However, there are different models and levels of state intervention in existence, which may
help to preserve or encourage the public sphere functions of the media. If the aforementioned link
between the quality of political communication and the quality of democracy is as prevalent as
argued, then it can perhaps be said that a purely commercial media system might not be the best
way to serve democratic interests. As Graeme Turner and Stuart Cunningham have explained, the
“government can provide two broad types of intervention: it  can subsidise the input to cultural
activity; or it can try to intervene through regulation.”91 This distinction of methods could be used to
roughly differentiate between what have been described as the US model and the European model:
84 Bresnahan, “Media and Neoliberal Transition in Chile,” 42
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the  US model  assumes  that  plurality  is  “best  achieved  as  a  result  of  self-regulation  of  media
markets”, while European regulation stresses “the provision for a public service broadcaster.”92 
Castillo points out that in Chile, neither the regulation nor the subsidising variant was opted
for, and the media development followed the US model.93 The post-socialist countries generally
chose the  European model,  partially  because  of  the  pressures  from European Union.94 Castillo
argues that due to the lack of subsidised public media in Chile, the media in general has been unable
to perform a positive role in democratisation, whilst in Europe, it has been the contrary.95 In Estonia,
despite extensive privatisation during the reform period, the dual model of commercial media and
public service broadcasting (PBS) was settled on. Castillo's argument on the qualitative difference
these models will produce will be further examined in the following chapters.96 In conclusion, the
ideal of the media as understood in this thesis is to serve as a public sphere institution during the
transition  process  and beyond,  but  the  actualisation  of  this  model  is  constrained  by variety of
factors, such as the market imperatives. Furthermore, the neoliberal objectives and the public sphere
are understood to be in a constitutive conflict, and in the following chapters it will be explored
whether  the  different  approaches  as  to  the  ownership  and  financing  of  the  media  within  the
neoliberal framework chosen by Estonia and Chile have resulted in different results. 
2. Estonian Media in Transition
This chapter will examine the main characteristics of Estonian media development, beginning with
the liberalisation during the final years of Soviet Union and finishing with the integration of EU
requirements concerning audiovisual media in 1999/2000 to Estonian media legislation. The first
section aims to offer a general background for the political opening manifesting itself in the changes
of the media from 1987 onwards, which in turn created a space for public debate that had been
repressed for decades. Liberalisation paved the way for the development of a democratic media
system after Estonia had become independent. The following two sections will focus on newspapers
and television broadcasting respectively, examining the changes in ownership, financing, content
and audience during the neoliberal transition, against the backdrop of the public sphere function the
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media had in the years of liberalisation. The issue of the necessity of state intervention, either in the
form of regulation or public service broadcasting will be addressed as well. 
2.1 From Glasnost to First Elections
The starting point for Estonian media development during the last years of Soviet Union was a press
and television system entirely under the control of the State and the Communist Party. The process
of liberalisation as reflected in the media begun with the glasnost, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev
in 1985. According to Jakubowicz,  glasnost and  perestroika were meant to serve as  “tools of a
carefully controlled process of social and economic modernisation”, but instead contributed to the
collapse of the Soviet system.97 Estonian media was initially slow to respond to the “glasnost-
induced growing freedom”,98 and only in 1987 did the journalists begin to trust that “the new, more
open and sincere style of political discourse” was indeed not “just a political game”.99 However,
once  the  media  caught  up  with  the  changing  political  climate,  their  rise  as  the  promoters  of
engagement, debate, and mass mobilisation followed with a striking verve. 
The official  mass  media  begun to channel  dialogue between various  groups and favour
active public participation in 1987.100 The most remarkable programs launched that year were the
weekly direct  broadcasts  of  the Council  of  the Artist  Unions on Estonian  Radio,  and a  public
discussion programme about “the tactics and strategies of democratic changes” called “Let's Think
Again” on Estonian TV.101  In 1988 with the emergence of popular fronts in the Baltics and easing
of censorship, new media outlets outside the official media system started to appear, and the official
media itself “began to speak the language of popular movements.”102 The media became crucial for
mass mobilisation, organisation of events such the Baltic Way in 1989 would not have been feasible
otherwise.103
It has been argued that in Estonia, during “1987–1989, journalism became a sort of popular
tribune  from which  to  represent,  voice  and defend  the  opinion of  the  masses”,104 and  that  the
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coordination of popular movements through the news media naturally led to its social leadership in
the  sovereignty movement.105 Lauristin  and Vihalemm claim that  the  “breakthrough”  period  of
1988–1991 was “the peak of public interest in the media”, due to journalists “becoming leaders and
advocates of new movements”, political pluralism being born and the emergence of the first wave
of the new press.106 After 1989, the first non-Soviet papers appeared in Estonia and the general trend
was to move away from political ideology towards a more objective form of journalism – even the
Party's  official  paper  Rahva  Hääl distanced  themselves  from the  official  ideology.107 In  1990,
following the victory of pro-independence candidates in the elections to Supreme Soviet, the Soviet
power was declared illegal and the official transition to democracy was decreed; in 1991, Estonia
became fully independent and in 1992, the first parliamentary elections followed. 
The first elections were held on September 20, 1992, and were successful for “the national
political forces supporting a radical marketisation and Westernisation of Estonia.”108 As mentioned
in the first chapter, consolidation of democracy and economic reform were two imperatives of the
post-socialist  countries.109 According  to  Lauristin  and  Vihalemm,  the  main  cause  of  division
between  the  new  government  and  the  opposition  was  defined  not  by  the  Left-Right  political
affiliation but rather by the readiness to launch radical economic and political reforms. The reform
strategy chosen by the government begun the neoliberal transition in Estonia: in accordance with
the  Washington Consensus  principles  discussed  earlier,  withdrawal  of  the  state  and creation  of
liberal market conditions were seen as the most important objectives. Lauristin and Vihalemm have
summarised the reform strategy of the new government accordingly: “Trying to open the window of
opportunity,  the  Estonian  government  chose the  path  of  maximum liberalisation:  no  tariffs,  no
subsidies,  no  regulated  prices  (with  the  exception  of  governmental  constraints  on  the  price  of
energy, water, health services, postal services), no progressive taxes, no quotas and no extensive
transfers of income. A private sector boomed, with about 15,000 new enterprises were registered
yearly. Foreign investments grew rapidly, reaching one of the highest levels in Eastern Europe.”110
Small-scale  privatisation  was  quickly  followed  by large-scale  privatisation  program,  conducted
through international auctions.
Following the rapid reform strategy and the extensive privatisation, the media system found
itself in fundamentally altered conditions. Aukse Balcytiene has pointed out that while the West
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served as a prime example for media development in the newly independent Baltic states, there is a
certain discrepancy between the “peculiarities of the national setting”111 and the Western ideals. She
argues that on the one hand, due to the Soviet past, the media in post-socialist countries have been
highly suspicious of state intervention, legal regulation and information policy, but on the other
hand, “the imported model of self-regulation does not work without being supported by strong
traditions  of  democratic  journalism  and  adequate  political  culture  in  society.”112 Thus,  the
development  of  independent  Estonia's  media  system has  been  moulded  by two paradigms:  the
liberal paradigm “favouring the complete independence and autonomy of the media and therefore
complete withdrawal of the State from media”, and “the paradigm of service to national values,
reconstruction and reinforcement of national identity, preservation of traditional values, and support
of national culture”. This paradigm assumes continued State intervention in the media.113 In other
words, while the neoliberal approach is imagined to favour the democratic character of the media
due to the freedom it offers from authorities, it is recognised that the market imperatives alone do
not foster the public sphere function of the media. The following two sections will examine the
developing of the newspaper and television system as situated within this tension. 
2.2 Newspapers
2.2.1 Trends in Ownership and Market Concentration
The easing of censorship in Estonia was promptly followed by a boom of journalism market –
between 1989 to 1996, almost 800 new periodicals appeared. In 1987, there were 32 newspapers
and 32 magazines published; by 1990, the number had risen to 52 and 51 respectively. In addition,
there  was  an  immense  rise  in  the  number  of  non-regular  periodicals,  launched  by  local
communities, political movements, and different associations.114 The main national dailies published
in Estonian  during the final  years  of  Soviet  rule  and the first  years  of  independence were the
following:  Rahva Hääl (until 1990 Communist Party newspaper; 1990–1992 official newspaper),
Päevaleht (until  01.02.1990  youth  paper  Noorte  Hääl),  Tallinn  newspaper  Õhtuleht and  Tartu
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newspaper  Postimees (until 01.01.1991 Edasi). The biggest weeklies published before 1989 were
Televisioon, Maaleht, and the cultural paper Sirp (until 07.07.1989, Sirp ja Vasar).115
The first new non-Soviet papers in Estonia were two weeklies,  Nelli  Teataja  founded in
October 1988 and  Esmaspäev in May 1989.116 Soon after that, two other important papers were
established which quickly gained a large readership: the “independent, privately owned general-
interest  weekly”  Eesti  Ekspress,  founded in September 1989, dominating “the market  from the
outset  in  circulation  figures  and  influence”,  and  an  economic  newspaper  Äripäev,  launched  in
October 1989 in cooperation with the Swedish firm Bonnier. These papers marked the emergence of
“a new non-partisan style journalism”117 and “the revival of Western-style traditions (...) offering
comparatively concise, clear and well-illustrated articles.”118 In 1991, two other popular weeklies,
Liivimaa Kroonika and Eesti Aeg were founded. 
The initial relief was soon replaced by confusion and difficulties as the state subsidies dried
up, liberal  reforms and privatisation were initiated and the media was reoriented towards profit
creation.  The  main  characteristics  of  the  reform phase  were  the  difficulties  experienced in  the
privatisation  process  of  Estonian  press,  rapidly  changing  editorial  structures  and  journalistic
functions, new work routines, lack of written regulations in 1991 and the search for new regulatory
systems, as well as rapid product changes.119 The years of 1990 and 1991 were a difficult time for
publications – they were “hit by soaring newspaper costs” due to “dwindling consignments from the
East and the need to buy printing materials from the West,”120 while the state subsidies, which had
so far supported the growing media market, were cut off. The costs of papers rose 100-fold between
1988 and 1993.  Not being able to cope with the harsh economic conditions, bigger part of local and
niche papers which had started between 1988 and 1991 closed down by 1993. Furthermore, the
circulation  of  periodicals  experienced  a  huge  drop  after  1990,121 in  relation  to  the  economic
difficulties experienced by the population after the launching of radical economic reforms in 1992 –
the living standards bottomed in 1992–1993, before starting to rise again in 1994.122
The privatisation of the press begun in 1991 and took about five to six years. According to
Kertu Saks, a specific feature of Estonian privatisation process was that “neither banks nor large
industrial corporations participated (...) and are not featured among newspaper owners.”123 Instead,
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the most common ownership model immediately after the privatisation was a joint-stock company,
where most of the shares were owned by the staff members.124 The joint-stock company model
proved to be unsustainable as the new shareholders lacked both capital and experience, and the
papers were later on sold to large media enterprises with foreign capital, led by business-oriented
and  economically  more  capable  owners.125 Since  1993,  the  media  has  experienced  a  growing
concentration of ownership, and by 1997, there were five national companies (AS Postimees, AS
Meediakorp, Eesti Päevalehe AS, AS Maaleht, and AS Sõnumileht) controlling most of the press.126
Further developments in 1998 led to two companies, Eesti  Meedia AS and AS Ekspress Grupp
monopolising the Estonian newspaper market.127 
Since 1995, the influx of foreign investment has played an important role in Estonian media
system – the first foreign investor was the Swedish company Bonnier, which had helped to establish
Äripäev in 1989. In Spring 1998, half of the shares in AS Meediakorp (later AS Ekspress Grupp)
were sold to Marieberg as a part of Bonnier Group. The Ekspress Grupp owned four papers, ten
magazines, and five free city papers by 1999. The second biggest investor in Estonian press media
was the Norwegian Schibsted; by 1998, the company had increased its shares in Postimees to 90%
and under the name AS Eesti Meedia, it owned seven newspapers with five supplements and eleven
magazines by 2000.128 Another change in ownership situation took place in 2001 when an Estonian
businessman  Hans  Luik  bought  50% of  the  shares  in  Ekspress  Grupp,  which  had  previously
belonged to Bonnier Group.129
By 2000, the most read papers published in Estonian were the national daily  Postimees,
daily tabloid SL Õhtuleht (a result of Õhtuleht and Sõnumileht merging in 2000), free city weekly
Linnaleht, national daily Eesti Päevaleht (created with the merging of Päevaleht, Hommikuleht and
Rahva Hääl in  1995),  national  weekly  Eesti  Ekspress,  national  weekly  Maaleht,  twice  a  week
advertising paper  Kuldne Börs,  and national business daily  Äripäev.  By 2001,  SL Õhtuleht had
passed Postimees in circulation, becoming the most read paper in Estonia. Nearly all of the papers
had suffered a huge drop in circulation in comparison to the 1990 and 1991 data – for example, the
circulation of Postimees in 1990 was 130,000, while in 2001, it was 64,000; the circulation of Eesti
Päevaleht dropped from 187,000 in 1990 to 38,000 in 2001. Only Eesti Ekspress had experienced a
rather stable circulation, peaking at 60,000 in 1991 and continuing at 49,000 in 2001.130 
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2.2.2 Changes in Content and Journalistic Vision
A prominent  process  in  the  1990s  was  the  “growing diversification  and fragmentation”  of  the
media: as the privatisation and marketisation progressed, new outlets were created to cater specific
audiences on niche issues and interests. Vihalemm and Lauristin argue that had the media in the
second half of the 1990s attempted to organise mass mobilisation on the scale of 1988–1989, it
would  have  failed  due  to  the  changed  nature  of  the  media  and  audience  fragmentation.131
Furthermore,  considering  the  growing  importance  of  television  and  the  general  tendency  of
preference for entertainment over political content once the anxious political times are left behind,
reading  newspapers  was  increasingly  becoming  an  elitist  habit.132 A development  of  crucial
importance during the radical reform period in Estonia was the generational shift among journalists
– “the new generation of journalists did not share the experiences of their older colleagues, who
took for granted an important political role for journalists in society.”133 
The “shock therapy” of the reform period divided the society into “winners” and “losers” -
on the “losing” side were the intellectuals and older generation who were actively engaged in the
restoration of independent Estonia, but who were effectively sidelined after the independence had
been gained.134 The “winning” side was reserved for the new, younger economic and political elite
who managed to take advantage of the conditions created by the rapidly developing liberal market
and among whom the bigger part of the managerial roles were distributed in the nascent republic of
Estonia. The dominant media outlets explicitly reflected this change. The market-driven new media
clearly  sided  with  the  “winners,”135 and  the  ideological  preferences  of  the  media  outlets  were
explicitly  distinguishable:  for  example,  the  most  influential  weekly  Eesti  Ekspress  strongly
supported right-wing policies,136 as did the business weekly Äripäev. 
Lauristin,  Lauk,  and Vihalemm have pointed  out  that  the  new media,  by rejecting  “the
national democratic traditions of the Estonian press (...) overtly address their content to the new
Establishment – young and successful audience”,  while “gutter papers”,  popular magazines and
commercial television cater the masses, thus furthering the already remarkable social and cultural
polarisation of the society.137 The tabloid SL Õhtuleht becoming the most read paper in Estonia in
2001  clearly  indicates  the  tendency  of  mass  preference  for  commercial  content  and  tabloids.
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Periodicals  with  cultural  content,  such  as  Sirp,  experienced  increasing  difficulties  and  loss  of
readership.  While  ostensibly  diverse,  the  prevalence  of  reform-oriented  and  right-wing  media
arguably undermined, not complimented the project of creating a democratic media system. 
Media commercialisation in Estonian context poses another interesting issue. Unlike many
other post-socialist countries, Estonia managed to escape the so-called “Italianisation” of the media
–  that  is,  strong  political  partisanship  of  media  organisations.138 For  example,  the  government
attempted to privatise Rahva Hääl to government friendly owners in 1993, but infamously failed as
the  journalists  of  Rahva Hääl refused  to  cooperate  and decided to  establish  a  new newspaper
instead.139 While generally free from direct political bias, the effects of commercial interests were
striking in the 1990s news and story reporting. Estonian media disclosed numerous corruption cases
in the 1990s,140 proving their ability to adjust to the watchdog role of democratic media. However,
Jakubowicz  has  discussed  that  the  market  requirements  which  cause  tabloidisation  turn  the
journalists into “hunting dogs”, “eager to publish each day a “shocking true story” about a public
figure.”141 This kind of news reporting, “dressed up as 'investigative journalism'”142 is partially the
fault  of lack of professionalism and knowledge among journalists,  and turns the news into “an
easily consumable hot dog.”143 
Aukse Balcytiene claims that the problem with the media in Baltic countries is that there are
no laws regulating cross-media ownership and media concentration,144 and from legal perspective,
the media is treated as any other commercial institution: the “competition legislation applies to the
media in the same way as it applies to all other economic sectors,” but the provision of information
is  not  just  a  business.145 She  argues  that  media  commercialism,  liberal  laws,  and  lack  of
professionalism all contribute to the creation of populism in the media.146 “In Estonia,” she writes,
“there is no institution to monitor media content systematically.”147 The state initiated attempts to
“correct  market  failure”148 do  not  necessarily  go  very  far,  although  there  are  some  assistance
schemes to help subsidise “cultural, youth and child-oriented, and scientific newspapers, magazines,
and journals”.149 
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On a more positive note, Lauristin and Vihalemm have reflected on the shift in media during
the crisis in public opinion following the 1999 elections and preparations for integration with the
EU, and have observed that media were after a long interval “used again as an active agency of
civic protest.”150 New social agenda entered the public debate, such as gender equality,  poverty,
drug problems, HIV and human rights; more attention was paid to the life and problems of the
“average  citizen”,  resulting  in  a  “more  balanced  picture  of  reality.”151 In  fact,  Lauristin  and
Vihalemm argue that “the crisis of 2001 appears to mark an end of the post-Communist transition in
Estonia.”152 It can be argued, then, that while many issues concerning journalistic output continued
and even intensified, it is possible to speak of a shift towards a more inclusive discourse in the press
after the turn of the century. 
2.3 Television
2.3.1 Public Broadcasting versus Commercial Television
The main feature of the development of television model in Estonia during the first  decade of
independence was the difficult process of figuring out how to settle on a functioning television
system which would encompass both public broadcasting service and commercial television. The
main obstacles were designing the character of public service media and finding a way to finance it
without undermining the commercial interests. Even though the European vision for media system
is generally understood as consisting of both public service and commercial media, the question of
whether the public  broadcasting service is  necessary in Estonia was still  debated in the end of
1990s. As Aukse Balcytiene has observed, the Baltic states soon figured out that changing the name
of a  previously Soviet  controlled state  media organisation to  something indicating that  its  new
function is to serve as a public broadcasting service, does not in fact mean that it naturally lives up
to  its  new  role.153 Arguably  the  television  dynamics  finally  started  to  consolidate  with  the
Amendment Act to the Broadcasting Act in 2001. 
While  the  press  had  already experienced  some diversification  during  the  final  years  of
Soviet Union, Estonia still had only one national TV channel until 1993. According to Hagi Shein,
“the ideas and principles of public broadcasting were first introduced in Estonia in 1990 when it
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became possible for broadcast personnel to participate in European media discussion.”154 Estonian
Broadcasting  was  formed  in  1990  as  a  replacement  for  Estonian  SSR  State  TV  and  Radio
Committee;  in  October,  Estonian  Television  (ETV)  and  Estonian  Radio  became  two  separate
organisations. In 1993, ETV was accepted to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU).155 It was an
important step from the public service broadcasting (PSB) development perspective as EBU set the
requirements according to which ETV's transition from Soviet state television to a PSB was to take
place:  the  emphasis  was  on  ensuring  programme  accessibility,  objectiveness  and  balance,
minorities' interests, programme quality and variety, and production of majority of its content.156
The television market started to open up between 1992 and 1994 to domestic operators, and
most firms who had applied for TV licences received them swiftly. Nine new operators appeared:
Estonian Christian Television, AloTV, Reklaamitelevisioon (RTV), AS Eesti Video (further EVTV),
AS  Taska  (Kanal  2),  Narva  Kommertstelevisioon,  AS  BFD  Reklaamiklubi,  AS  Orsent,  Eesti
Sõltumatu Televisiooni AS (TV1) and Tipp TV.157 However, due to the smallness of Estonian market
and the high expenses of production and transmission of programming, such a number of operators
was unsustainable. The period of rough competition between bigger operators in 1993 and 1994
became known as the “TV wars”, and resulted in four national channels with 85-99% audience
penetration dominating the market: ETV, TV1 (AS Sõltumatu Televisiooni AS; lost its licence in
2001), Kanal 2 (AS Taska), and TV 3 (EVTV, RTV, and Kinnevik's merger in 1996).158 
In search of some kind of regulatory framework, the drafting of the Broadcasting Act begun
in 1993 and the Act was passed in 1994. The Broadcasting Act defined ETV and Estonian Radio as
public  broadcasting  service,  and established  a  scheme for  their  funding.  The  financing was  to
consist of state funding (the sum would be decided on yearly), and advertising revenues (the share
of advertising could not exceed 5% of total  programming).  The Broadcasting Act  set  PSB and
commercial  broadcasting against  each  other  in  competition  for  advertising revenues,  which  the
latter  perceived to  be  unjust,  as  PSB was already receiving  financial  support  from the state.159
Furthermore, ETV did not stick to the set percentage of allowed advertising on its channel, and the
tensions between PSB and commercial broadcasting intensified as a result of it. A few alternate
financing schemes were experimented with – in 1997, ETV started selling its advertising time to the
three main private channels, and in return received a share of their revenues. This model worked
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until 1999, when advertising revenues started to decrease and the private broadcasters failed to meet
the  payments  to  ETV.160 The  final  solution  was  settled  on  with  the  Amendment  Act  in  2001,
according to which ETV would “abandon spot advertising, teleshopping and sponsorship,”161 state
funding would become PSB's primary source of income. 
Concerning  television  media  ownership,  Estonian  companies  and  Estonian  money
eventually did not manage to sustain themselves on the television market, and all of the Estonian-
owned  private  television  broadcasters  either  went  bankrupt  or  sold  most  of  their  shares.162
According to the Broadcasting Act, the private broadcasting organisations had to be controlled by a
minimum of 51% domestic ownership; nevertheless, the full control of private broadcasters shifted
to foreign owners. Kanal 2 was obtained by Norwegian company Schibsted, TV 3 by the Modern
Time Group  of the Swedish Kinnevik and the Finnish Mainos TV, and TV 1 by Polstat. 163 As of
2001, the Estonian TV landscape included all Finnish TV stations with a 40% audience penetration,
and  Latvian  TV  near  the  border;  the  main  cable  programming  providers  were  Tallinn  Cable
Television,  Starman and STV. There were more than 60 channels available via cable networks,
including over 30 Russian TV channels.164
2.3.2 Changes in Programming and Audience Preferences
The tendencies in television content change in Estonia follow the general developments associated
with the media in neoliberal market conditions. As the new TV channels were launched in liberal
market conditions with no state subsidies, their programming was directed towards gaining high
audience rates since their  inception.  But as Andres Jõesaar  points out,  since both the PSB and
commercial broadcasters were exposed to the market forces and fought for advertising revenues in
the 1990s,  the  general  inclination  among all  broadcasters  was towards  entertainment  and mass
culture.165 It has also been noted that especially after 1993, as the society grew less interested in
politics, the programs with highest viewer ratings were no longer the main ETV news broadcasts,
but new game shows and serials.”166 This once more confirms the “rich media, poor democracy”
paradox outlined in the first chapter.167 Reflecting on these changes, Hagi Shein has discussed that
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“the lack of necessary financial  means,  and, the need, whatever it  took, to hold on to majority
audience, and to move ahead the emerging private television that appealed first of all the mass
tastes, coupled with an insufficient understanding of the nature of public TV programming, created
insecurity and forced commercial tendencies in public broadcasting development.”168
One  indicator  of  the  commercialisation  process  is  the  increase  in  average  hours  spent
watching TV: in 1985, the average was two hours per day, at the beginning of 1994 – three hours,
and by 1997, it had risen to four hours per day.169 After 1995, the audience fragmentation continued
rapidly  as  a  result  of  television  broadcasters  actively  seeking  for  target  audience,  and  the
introduction  of  Western,  mostly  American  productions  became  dominant.170 The  cheap  South
American  programmes,  so-called  “soap  operas”,  also  became  increasingly  popular  with  the
audiences. Research conducted on the changes in private broadcasting programming focusing on
the  years  1993–2004  have  clearly  shown  that  the  transmission  time  of  news  dropped  twice,
bottoming at  the  minimum 5,4% required  by law;  transmissions  of  locally  produced children's
programs as  well  as educational  programs disappeared completely;  the transmission of  current,
public  and  political  affairs  dropped  to  1%  in  2004.  Instead,  the  transmission  time  has  been
dedicated to game shows and entertainment.171 
The  main  reason  for  the  commercialisation  of  the  media  were  indeed  the  market
mechanisms, but Shein has also seen a connection between the social and economical conditions of
the time (the quoted section  is  about  1995–1997) which may explain why the audiences  were
interested  in  such  content  in  the  first  place.  His  reasoning  is  the  following:  “..  television
programming fully reflected the controversies of real life at the time. The functions of the media
were changing. News and information programmes remained important, but at the same time more
and more programming time was devoted to fiction and entertainment. One third of the Estonian
population was living below the poverty line and this fact may possibly explain the huge audiences
gleaned by more than twenty different soap operas which ran daily on Estonian screens. Different
games and game shows remained at the top of the ratings lists.”172 This development connects with
the  idea  of  political  and  educational  content  losing  importance  after  the  political  situation  has
somewhat  stabilised,  the  public  sphere  concept  becomes less  relevant  for  the  audiences  as  the
market-oriented media offers more entertainment content to satisfy their media consumption needs.
Andres  Jõesaar  explains  that  the  competition  for  advertising  revenues  caused  a
differentiation in orientation of the Estonian TV channels, a process reaching completion in 2000. In
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ETV programming, news, education and social programmes prevailed; Kanal 2 focused on films,
serials,  and soap operas;  TV3 on the other  hand on reality shows and participatory games  for
money.173 The statistics on the most popular TV programmes on each channel in 2000 confirms this
observation. The most popular programs on ETV in 2000 were all Estonian-produced, including an
infotainment program  Pealtnägija,  and the news program  Aktuaalne Kaamera with high viewer
ratings; one of the most watched programs on TV3 was a TV game Kuldvillak, and three out of five
of the programs on Kanal 2 that made the list were serials – two of them Latin American and one of
UK origin.174 In comparison, according to a survey, 13 out of 15 of the top TV programmes in 1994
appeared on ETV.175
Interestingly enough, ETV had the highest audience share of all Estonian national channels
until 1999.176 It is quite unusual for a public service broadcasting channel to be able to compete with
commercial channels so successfully during a period where the entertainment function of the media
is increasingly prevalent. Between 1995 and 1997, ETV's audience share was constantly between
35% and 40%, and the credibility and objectivity as estimated by the public  was around 73%.
Furthermore, “ETV remained the largest producer of the most varied home-produced programming
in the Estonian language and in  cultural  programming as well.  The average of home-produced
programming on ETV was constantly over 60%, while  commercial  channels could not  manage
more than 30% of in-house production.”177 Nevertheless, during 1997 and 1999, the weekly share of
PBS gradually decreased as the private  channels gained momentum, and finally in  April  1999,
TV3's viewer ratings surpassed ETV's with 2 percent.178 The ETV's “flagship program”, the evening
news broadcast  Aktuaalne Kaamera, continued to be the most highly ranked news program.
Important developments concerning media legislation were the implementation of EU media
policies and the amendment to the Broadcasting Act between 1999 and 2002. Central to the EU
media policy is the ideology of common market, which however does not take into consideration
country-specific circumstances, such as the size of the market or cultural and historical context.179
Namely the Television without Frontiers policy poses certain threats to national media market. As
Jõesaar argues, in smaller countries there are fewer resources available for the national channels,
and the commercial  media organisations focus first  and foremost  on mainstream programming;
thus, in the conditions of a small  market such as Estonia,  the role of PSB becomes even more
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significant.180 On a more positive note, some of the EU requirements implemented in 1999/2000
also emphasise cultural values – for example, “10% of the broadcasting time should be reserved to
independent European producers”, 51% “to European works”, and “50% of the own productions
about Estonia's present issues or Estonian cultural heritage must be broadcast during prime time.”181
In  conclusion,  the  development  of  Estonian  media  system as  a  result  of  the  neoliberal
principles applied during the transition process has led from a fully state-controlled media before
1987 to a highly privatised press and a European-style dual broadcasting model in television. From
mid-1990s onwards, foreign investment and foreign ownership have been important shapers of the
media development. Both the press and the television are very scarcely regulated, and from legal
perspective,  media  organisations  are  treated  as  any  other  profit-seeking  businesses.  The  only
exception  is  the  Broadcasting  Act  of  1994  with  amendments  and  from  1999  onwards,  EU
requirements  regarding  audiovisual  media.  Content  and  purpose-wise,  Estonian  media  has
experienced  the  common  issues  associated  with  neoliberal  transition:  commercialisation  and
tabloidisation, struggles concerning state ownership and intervention, and diversification of media
outlets but not necessarily of content. The main problem, however, might be that while the public
sphere function of the media is continuously valued, private broadcasting does not prioritise it and
the question of state intervention is continuously a sensitive one. 
3. Chilean Media in Transition
The dynamics of the Chilean transition to democracy is very complex as there was no clear cut
between the policies of the outgoing military rulers and the incoming democratic authorities in
economic terms. In order to make sense of the media development in these conditions, the first
section focuses on giving a general description of the process itself. The Chilean media developed,
in a sense, on two fronts – as the official media and the alternative media, and the fate of these
outlets have been accordingly different during and after the change of regime. The first section will
thus review the conditions specific to Chilean neoliberal transition. The second section focuses on
the  print  media  –  newspapers  and  magazines,  and  the  third  section  on  television.  Changes  of
financing, ownership, content, and audiences will be addressed. The final section will briefly look at
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the  restrictions  on the  development  of  a  truly democratic  media  in  Chile  during  the  transition
period, both state and self-imposed. 
3.1 The End of the Dictatorship
Patricio Navia has pointed out that the dictatorship in Chile, which lasted for 17 years, did not
initially seek to build a new institutional order.182 The economically liberal but socially, culturally,
and politically highly repressive regime started to experience economic difficulties after 1982. As
the first wave of mass protests in Chile swept the country in 1983, the opposition started pressing
for immediate transition to democratic order.183 They did not succeed in their objectives at the time,
but the regime was gradually forced to “open some political room” for the opposition.184 As an
important development, the middle class started to reappear in the public debate in 1983 – until
then, they had been able to enjoy some level of financial comfort, but were now hit by the economic
crisis  which contributed to the growing social  discontent.185 Furthermore,  pro-democratic media
begun to cautiously reappear;  Radio Cooperativa as an example of  one of the few non-regime
stations still operating, had an important role in covering as well as promoting the public meetings
and street rallies.186 
The next big step towards democratisation was the year 1986, which became known as the
año decisivo,  marked by a  new wave of  street  protests  and the  creation  of  Civic  Assembly. 187
According  to  Castillo,  in  1986  “the  street  protests  became  public  spheres  of  community  and
dialogue.”188 John Paul II’s visit to Chile in 1987 confirmed that the authoritarian foundation was
cracking: for the first time since Pinochet’s rise to power, uncensored broadcasting covering the
meetings and papal events was allowed on television.189 Social protests and the rising opposition
managed to pressure the authorities into agreeing to a plebiscite in  1988, which was to  decide
whether  Pinochet  should  continue  to  lead  the  country for  another  eight  years.  The opposition,
concentrated  into  Concertacion  de  Partidos  por  la  Democracia  (in  translation,  “based  upon
agreement”),190 symbolised finally overcoming the “irreconcilability between the major  political
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camps”191 (Chilean  partisanship  had  traditionally  been  strongly  divided  on  the  left/centre/right
lines), allowing them to stand as a united force against the Pinochet regime and gain major public
support. 
Almost 90 percent of eligible Chileans visited the ballot box in 1988, a record turnout for the
country.192 The regime officials had no doubt they would sweep to victory, and “went out of their
way to ensure a fraud-free election so they could prove to doubters that they had won fairly.” 193
After all, the economic conditions at the time of the plebiscite were favourable for the regime, 194
and Pinochet counted on the support of the conservatives and the elites.195 Even after the opposition
had  won  the  plebiscite,  the  military  still  remained  in  power  for  17  months  and  Pinochet  was
officially the president until 1990. In 1989, both presidential and congressional elections took place,
and  were  once  again  successful  for  the  Concertacion  coalition. Pamela  Constable  and  Arturo
Valenzuela have argued that the outgoing rulers were “utterly unprepared to compete in democratic
context after  16 years of comfortable inaction”196,  while the Concetracion worked hard to build
unity among themselves and line behind one presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin, as their first
priority  was  to  re-establish  democracy  and  not  seek  partisan  advantage.197 In  1990,  the  pro-
democratic forces assumed to power, marking the beginning of transition to democracy. 
If one were to decide based on external parameters, then Chilean transition might appear
rather  peaceful and unproblematic.  For five years after  the plebiscite in 1988, Chile developed
quickly towards consolidation.198 According to Przeworski, Chile was economically exceptional in
Latin  America,  as  the  new  democratic  authorities  did  not  assume  to  power  during  an  acute
economic crisis199, nor inherited „an enormous external and internal debt”.200 The partisanship of
different political camps had been ostensibly overcome: the Concertacion government consisted of
several  parties  with  different  ideological  guidelines  but  the  same democracy-imbued approach,
prepared  to  compromise  with  each  other.201 The  concept  of  democracy built  on  an  underlying
consensus permeates the Chilean transition on all levels – politically, socially, economically, but
more  often  than  not,  it  has  meant  external  uniformity  instead  of  internal  agreement.  The  two
190 Geraldine Lievesley, Democracy in Latin America: Mobilisation Power and the Search for New Politics 
(Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 54 
191 Ibid., 53 
192 Navia, “Living in Actually Existing Democracies,” 312
193 Constable and Valenzuela, “Chile’s Return to Democracy,” 172
194 Navia, “Living in Actually Existing Democracies,” 305
195 Constable and Valenzuela, “Chile’s Return to Democracy,” 172 
196 Ibid., 178 
197 Ibid.,  177 
198 Carsten Q. Schneider, “The Consolidation of Democracy of Across Time ans Space,” in The Consolidation of 
Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2009), 35
199 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 140
200 Ibid., 143
201 Lievesley, Democracy in Latin America, 53 
   32 
particularities  –  a  high  level  of  political  consensus  among  political  elites,  and  the  persisting
framework of neoliberal legacy left  in place by the outgoing military regime,202 form a central
paradox of Chilean transition. 
The  outgoing  military  rulers  were  able  to  dictate  the  terms  of  transition,  and  created
favourable conditions for themselves in the post-authoritarian Chile. Several last minute reforms
were conducted to make sure that the military personnel would not be convicted for human rights
abuses,  Pinochet received a  position of senator for life,  a national  security council  with strong
military representation was created, the supreme court packed with pro-Pinochet members was left
behind and an electoral law was put in place, which made the amendment of the 1980 Constitution
virtually impossible without the consent of Pinochet's supporters.203 These conditions were accepted
by the pro-democratic forces – their only advantage over the military regime was their legitimacy,
but in case of a new military coup, they would have been powerless. The democratic authorities, in
turn, legitimised certain features, such as the neoliberal economic policy, which had been imposed
on the populace undemocratically during the dictatorship.204
Claudia Mellado and Arjen Van Dalen have labelled Chile a “social  laboratory”,  for the
neoliberal economic transformation since 1973 have been profound.205 They argue that the media
have played a central role in “conveying a storyline of political cohesion, stability, and consensus
between the political and economic elites,”206 creating a continuity between the authoritarian and
democratic regimes in Chile. In comparison, the period of socialist government of Salvador Allende
from 1970 to 1973 was a time of diverse and ideologically polarised press (Castillo has called it
“trench journalism”207): as many as 46 newspapers were published and in vigorous confrontation
with each other, either supporting or opposing the government.208 This phase of the most diverse
media  landscape  in  the  history  of  Chile  was  in  stark  contrast  with  what  came  immediately
afterwards. The dictatorship shut down all media outlets that did not support the military coup, cut
the  state  funding,  imposed  censorship,  and  replaced  educational  and  cultural  programming  on
television with entertainment.
Nevertheless, the opposition managed to build “an impressive information infrastructure,”
consisting of clandestine and semi-clandestine newsletters, other micro-media outlets, magazines
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and newspapers with national circulation.209 Some magazines and newspapers offering alternative
views to that of the official information started already a couple of years after the institution of the
Pinochet  regime, such as  APSI  and  Analisis,  and others such as  La Bicicleta,  Hoy,  Cauce, and
Pluma  y  Pincel were  established  throughout  the  authoritarian  period.  Two  regime-critical
newspapers, La Epoca and Fortin Mapocho were also available by 1987.210 Television as the most
controlled media outlet went through a limited political opening only right before the change in
regime: uncensored broadcasting of the Pope's visit was allowed in 1988 and both YES and NO
campaigns were allowed 15 to 30 minutes of broadcasting time per day to promote their views
before the plebiscite of 1988.211
The media during the democratic transition, then, was oddly situated within the tension of
multiple contradictory discourses. On the one hand, there existed the alternative media, which had
been  boldly  supporting  democracy  during  the  authoritarian  regime;  after  the  institution  of
democracy, that same media was suddenly expected to prioritise consensus and support for the new
authorities,  without  questions,  over  the  analytical-critical  role  they  had  played  during  the
dictatorship. Furthermore, if the media opposed the legacies of the authoritarian regime which had
been left in place and legitimised by the new authorities, this was now interpreted as opposing the
democratic  elites  themselves.  Paley speaks  of  “marketing democracy”  in  Chile  in  the sense  of
carefully  and  intentionally  promoting  “images  of  democracy,”212 a  construction  and  display  of
seeming commonality that  became a mode of  action  of  a  sort,  and a  political  purpose for  the
Concertacion  coalition.  The  post-dictatorship  regime  in  Chile  has  occasionally  been  called
democracia  lite –  “low-fat  democracy,”213 and  has  controversially  resulted  in  an  impoverished
media landscape. The following two sections will examine the press and the television broadcasting
in these conditions.
 
3.2 Newspapers and Magazines
Castillo has argued that the new authorities assumed power with no clear media policy in mind.214
However, as the entire transition had been built upon the concept of compromise and consensus, the
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vision the new government had for the media was that they should help to legitimise the policies
applied  as  a  result  of  this  obscure  concurrence,  as  explained  earlier.  Concertacion,  in  the
independent media sphere that had managed to bloom under the dictatorship, “inherited a major
democratic resource,”215 but instead of finding ways to support and encourage them to fulfil their
democratic potential, the new authorities rather treated the press as a threat instead of an ally. In
fact, as Castillo has noted, the Chilean political elite favoured “moderation in the news coverage of
controversial issues”, with the objective of “maintaining the integrity of 'politics by agreements'”;
they even called on the media “not to obstruct” the process of transition.216 Bresnahan has argued
that not only did the government fail to support the independent media outlets, “but in some cases
actively contributed to their demise.”217 
Perhaps the biggest issue concerning the Chilean press in the 1990s was the question of
financing.  Although the media system had been left  to  survive  in  neoliberal  market  conditions
already under the dictatorship, many of the independent papers and magazines had received foreign
financial  aid  –  for  example,  the  magazine  Analisis had  received  funding  from  the  Dutch
government, which Chilean president Patricio Aylwin personally blocked in 1993.218 Other media
outlets had been supported by international solidarity groups and European advertisers as well.219
The  disappearance  of  these  financial  resources  was  justified  by  the  government  by  ostensibly
assisting  the  independent  press  “in  weathering  their  own  transition  to  a  purely  market
environment”.220 The  foreign  organisations  and  institutions  themselves  did  not  believe  further
assistance was strictly necessary, now that democracy had been instituted in Chile. All media outlets
were  forced  to  compete  for  advertising  revenues,  but  despite  the  change  of  government,  the
advertising market continued to be politicised to an extent which made it difficult, if not impossible,
for independent papers and magazines to survive. According to Bresnahan, a publication's political
position was more important to advertisers than its demographics or even circulation.221
A bigger part of the independent magazines and papers closed over the following years. An
investigative  journalism magazine  Cauce closed  in  1989,  Pluma y Pincel  in  1993 and  Pagina
Albierta in 1991. Analisis was bought by Christian Democrats in 1991 and managed to keep up its
journalistic quality for a year, but then found itself in irresolvable difficulties.  APSI attempted to
tune to market demands and started including popular culture in its coverage, and thus managed to
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last a little longer than others, but nevertheless closed down in 1995. Hoy magazine discontinued in
1998 and  Fortin Mapocho  in 1991.222 The small weekly  El Siglo and the biweekly  Punto Final
offered critical approaches to Concertacion government, but their historical association with leftist
movements kept the circulation down. The closure of La Epoca in 1998, however, was a true blow
to the independent press scene in Chile – it was a symbolic “failure of the new politico-economic
environment to sustain a pluralist press”, and was lamented for “the paper's failure to realise its full
potential as an independent voice during the transition.”223 
By the end of 1990s, then, the only competitor to the duopoly of El Mercurio and Copesa
was a “quasi-government paper” La Nacion224 – essentially, the press had circled back to what it had
been like during the early years of the dictatorship. El Mercurio S.A. and Copesa were two media
organisations that were allowed to operate and were strongly supported throughout the dictatorship
by the military, due to their suitable ideological line and close personal relationships between the
political end entrepreneurial elite. Kristin Sorensen has pointed out that “virtually all media has
been owned by only a few different individuals and families who were staunch supporters of the
Pinochet regime.”225 El Mercurio, belonging to Agustin Edwards Eastman and his family, was one
of such papers. It was established in 1827 and has historically set the news agenda in Chile 226;
Castillo claims that “when Agustin Edwards decides not to publish something, he leaves more than
half of the Chileans without access to this information.”227 La Tercera, later the biggest paper of
Copesa  group,  was  founded  in  1950  by  Picó  Cañas family.  Both  El  Mercurio and  Copesa
experienced financial difficulties after 1982, were rescued by the military government, and Copesa
was acquired by a business group that had a cosy relationship with the junta. Since 1990s, it has
been controlled by one of the neoliberal economists close to the regime, Alvaro Saieh.228
Already under Allende, El Mercurio “became a tool of psycho-political warfare”, assisted by
CIA, and the editorial line advocated “the inevitability” of the military coup.229 Very little changed
after the institution of democracy. The owners of both El Mercurio S. A. and Copesa stayed the
same as they had been under the dictatorship, and continued to promote the familiar right-wing and
conservative views. Castillo supposes that  El Mercurio has been able to keep up a considerably
large readership even under the democracy because it has been “aiming at general consensus on
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central conservative values such as free market and private property, and by playing the role of an
intermediary  among  different  factions  of  the  Chilean  right.”230 El  Mercurio also  publishes  the
popular tabloids  La Segunda and  Las Ultimas Noticias, in addition 14 provincial papers; Copesa
also owns the market leading tabloids La Tercera and La Cuarta, morning and afternoon free city
papers, and the news magazine Que Pasa.231
One way to assess the pluralism of Chilean print media is to take a look at whether and how
is the authoritarian past treated in the press. An outstandingly important issue in the case of Chile is
the  difficult  and  painful  legacy of  human  rights  violations  that  took  place  under  the  Pinochet
regime. The poor, the peasants, ethnic minorities, environmental agenda, and human rights groups
have all been traditionally excluded from the news agenda of the prevalent right wing media.232 In
the end of 1990s, the media coverage on such issues was exceptionally poor, as the old independent
media had been forced out of business and new outlets had not yet emerged. According to Sorensen,
comprehensive coverage on Pinochet regime and its legacy of human rights violations can only be
found in alternative press, but many alternative outlets are unfortunately not widely read by the
general audience.233 First notable exception to this rule was The Clinic, founded in 1998. 
Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on October 16, 1998 and detained in the London
Clinic, which the new periodical took its name after. The Clinic was founded by a group of people
in  their  twenties  and  thirties  who  had  grown  up  under  the  Pinochet  regime.234 According  to
Bresnahan, this paper proved to be immensely popular, especially among the youth, due to “its
skewering of hypocrisy across the political spectrum and willingness to take on issues from human
rights to sexuality.”235 Sorensen explains that The Clinic offers a fresh perspective, addressing taboo
topics in Chilean society through a satirical lens, and that the “trickster is given unique authority to
criticise the existing social order with relative safety.”236 Any serious newspaper would not get away
with such explicit references to the former dictator. Furthermore,  The Clinic  is popular among a
diverse array of readers, “many of whom would never dream of picking up a paper like El Siglo at
the kiosk.”237 The founding of  The Clinic begun a period of cautious revival of investigative and
analytical press. 
Other new independent papers and magazines appeared after the arrest, such as a political-
cultural  monthly  Rociante,  anti-neoliberal twice-weekly  La Firme;  Le Monde Diplomatique,  La
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Huella, El Periodista.  All  of them, however, have struggled for their survival in the politicised
advertising conditions. Futhermore, Bresnahan argues that The Clinic could not fill the void of an
independent daily newspaper. Several attempts have been made, most significantly El Mostrador,
“financed by a group of investors willing to sustain the paper from their personal resources for a
year or more until it became established, went online in 1999”; in September 2000, Primera Linea
emerged, edited initially by the former editor of Analisis, Juan Pablo Cardenas, but the paper closed
in 2003.238 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, then, the Chilean press landscape went through a new
wave of diversification, but the continuous hostile market conditions and neoliberal ideology, hand
in hand with the lack of state support, have suspended the emergence of a truly pluralistic press. 
3.3 Television
Television  was first  introduced in  Chile  in  early 1960s.  Realising  both  the  great  potential  and
dangers of this new medium, the government placed it  under the control of state universities –
private ownership was not allowed, as the risk of manipulation was perceived to be too serious.239
Although television was regulated by the General Law of 1970, which assigned television the role
of “maintaining, promoting, and developing local cultural expression” and attempted to guarantee
editorial independence, it never quite fulfilled this purpose as the state-imposed educational concept
was not supported by an adequate state funding scheme. As a result, advertisement became a major
player in the television system from the very beginning.240 Under Allende, educational and social
programming was promoted; under dictatorship, the function of television changed completely. The
mixture of state and private funding was replaced with commercial advertising exclusively in 1975,
“presumably  stimulating  a  proliferation  of  companies  skilled  in  publicity  over  the  subsequent
years.”241 At the same time, due to the influx of cheap imported electronic goods, by 1987 most of
Chilean household were able to afford a television set.242 
As Paley puts it, “by the late 1980s, when competition for leadership of the country had
begun, the conditions  (in terms of access to  TVs, and a history of government involvement in
programming) were present for widespread use of televised publicity in politics.”243 The transition
period marked a turning point  for the television system, as commercial  broadcasting and cable
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television were introduced and the US-style commercial model took root in Chile. In the 1990s,
television  became  attractive  to  foreign  investors  as  the  medium  had  a  high  level  of  market
penetration: 95 percent nationally and 99 percent in Santiago.244 Transnational corporations quickly
entered Chilean television market. The first private licence was granted to an ex-Pinochet official
Ricardo Claro for Megavision, which aired in October 1990. Later, he sold 49% of the shares to
Televisa, a Mexican media giant, but bought them back in 2002.245
Newspaper chain Copesa marked their entrance to the television market with La Red, which
was aired in May 1991. Mexico's TV Azteca bought 75% of La Red in 1998, and planned to focus
on sports and news. In 1993, Channel 11, which had been so far controlled by University of Chile,
was forced to lease its frequencies to Venezuelan media conglomerate, the Cinseros group, due to
growing financial difficulties. The channel was renamed Chilevision. Officially, University of Chile
still owned the channel, but had little control over the content. There was also an expansion of cable
and  satellite  television  –  around  20  percent  of  Chilean  households  receive  paid  services.  The
industry has consolidated rapidly and resulted in just two cable providers, Metropolis Intercom and
VTR, control 95 percent of the national cable market, “making cable Chile's most concentrated
medium.”246 The ownership of Metropolis Intercom is equally divided between Megavision's Claro
and US-based Liberty Media. The leading cable provider VTR is entirely owned by subsidiary of
UnitedGlobal  Com  –  the  largest  international  provider  of  broadband  services.  The  satellite
television is led by SKY-Chile: a consortium of Televisa, Brazin's Globo, and Rupert Murdoch's
News Corporation, which controls 90 percent of the market with DirectTV. 247
While the television market has rapidly expanded, just 2% of the programming in Chile is
dedicated to cultural matters. The advertising revenues outweigh government subsidies on such a
scale that it is hardly a surprise that Chilean television has been blamed for “eminently commercial
character, its interest in capturing large audiences with simplistic language, its lack of innovation,
and its insufficient contribution to the education of children”.248 Bresnahan sees this as an especially
significant  failure  as  the  television,  having  recovered  “from  its  low  credibility  during  the
dictatorship,”  has  become  “the  most  relied-upon  and  trusted  news  source.”249 The  state-owned
National Television Network (TVN) represents a development with a more positive character. By
the end of the dictatorship, TVN has in heavily in debt. Right-wings politicians loyal to Pinochet,
deeming public service broadcasting unnecessary and potentially a challenge for the traditional right
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wing Catholic University Channel (13), proposed selling it.250 Since 1992, however, it  has been
governed by a board of seven members, who represent diverse political views. Content-wise, the
channel carries “high-quality cultural programs and has rod on politically sensitive ground by airing
documentaries on human rights abuses during the dictatorship.”251 
Valerio Fuenzalida, further underlining the role TVN has on the Chilean television market,
argues that television has without a doubt become “the main source of information about the nation,
the world, and the locality for seven out of every ten Chileans.”252 News programs constitute the
main source of information, and television news receive higher ratings than the press or the radio
for  “veracity,  amount  of  information,  and  political  objectivity.”253 During  the  1990s,  TNV in
comparison to the most popular channel TV 13 and Megavision, experienced the biggest growth in
broadcasting hours and hours of news viewed on the channel by households annually, concluding
that the Chileans are confident in the information dispersed by this channel.254 In the turn of the
century, TVN aired five news broadcasts, totalling three and half hours a day on weekdays and an
hours and a half on the weekends; an interview and debate program Medianoche, a news discussion
program  La  Entrevista  del  Domingo on  Sundays,  and  two  investigative  journalism  programs,
Informe Especial and Historie de la Noticia.255
TVN by itself, however, is unable to balance the highly concentrated and commercialised
television market in Chile. Broadcasting is highly centralised: five channels are centred in Santiago
and  transmit  to  the  rest  of  the  country;  the  ownership  of  television  has  mainly  passed  to
transnational media giants.256 An attempt was made in 1996 to create a new “ecological, citizen, and
cultural” channel, TV Canelo – it was supposed to be carried by VTR and feature socially conscious
programming. VTR dropped the project on the last minute, with the excuse of corporate policy
forcing them to focus on international programming.257 The main reason for the commercialisation
of the television market are the neoliberal economic policies, but Fuenzalida also brings in a social
element. According to audience survey in Chile, the expectations for programming were tied to the
desire to compensate for everyday life deficiencies concerning family and surroundings, mainly in
relation to material difficulties. Fuenzalida argues that “the home is the location of many of the
problems that most affect the audience”, and for the numerous people living below the poverty line,
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television is a means for emotional support and self-confidence, rather than formal education. To
Fuenzalida, this explains the popularity of soap operas and reality television.258 If that is true, the
commercialisation  of  television  content  is  not  only  due  to  the  market  conditions,  but  at  least
partially also responds to audience demand. 
3.4 Legal Restrictions and Self-Censorship
Two other important features, which greatly affect the way Chilean media system functions, must
be briefly addressed. These constitute the legal restrictions obstructing the work of journalists, and
the prevailing culture of self-censorship. From a legal perspective, one of the main obstacles on the
way of Chilean democratisation process is the fact that the new democratic authorities still operate
within the framework of 1980 Constitution, adopted by the dictatorship. As mentioned earlier, the
institutional traces left behind by the military regime have made it extremely difficult to amend the
Constitution, not to mention replacing it. Restrictions on journalism are to a great extent the result
of this Constitution of low democratic quality. Self-censorship stems from more elusive origins, but
is a remarkable obstacle in the development of a democratic journalistic culture in Chile. 
Three groups with special obligations were singled out in the 1980 Constitution: political
parties,  the  unions,  and the  media.  According to  the  Constitution,  journalists  have  the  greatest
responsibility in the society and anyone who had been condemned or accused of terrorist acts within
the  last  15  years  could  not  be  a  journalist  –  the  “responsibility”  clause  was  effective  in
extinguishing any spark of opposition in the media.259 The most obscure, and dangerous, part from
media's perspective were firstly the section 6b of the State internal Security Law, which prohibited
anything that would “defame, libel, or slander the President, government ministers, members of the
Congress, superior court judges, and the commanders in chief of the armed forces.”260 Secondly, the
Abuse of Publicity Law from 1967, which established “extremely harsh penalties against anyone
who knowingly published classified documents or any material related to criminal investigations
conducted by a court of law.”261 It also “recognised offences against honour and privacy as valid
reason for prohibiting circulation of a publication.”262 These laws were used even during the 1990s
after democratic authorities were in power – Bresnahan has marked that the government would
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much  rather  keep  its  own political  capital  intact  than  sacrifice  the  undemocratic  legal  system
keeping them untouchable.263
Only in 2001 was the new Law on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Practice of
Journalism, shortly the Press Law, finally passed. It eliminated many of the “legal weapons” that the
dictatorship had used against the journalists who refused to walk the line. The Press Law eliminated
the section 6b of the State Internal Security Law, revoked the provision allowing civilian journalists
to be prosecuted in military courts, and replaced the Abuse of Publicity Law. However, it did not
overturn all of the “insult” offences from the penal code.264 Castillo further argues that the Press
Law “failed to incorporate a special defence against breach of privacy”, and journalists are still
deprived of the public interest defence, the “cornerstone of defamation defences in other western
democracies.”265 The Press Law also did nothing to fight the stifling atmosphere of self-censorship. 
It has been said that Chile is in a sense a “democracy without people”,266 and that Chilean
society  lives  in  a  “socio-cultural  schizophrenia”,  where  the  progressive  free-market  economy
clashes with the culturally regressive sphere.267 One of the most difficult legacies to overcome is the
pervasive  culture  of  fear,  which  discourages  journalists  to  try  and pursue  more  daring  stories,
resulting in passivity. Under the dictatorship, there were no “official” guidelines on censorship, and
what exactly was not allowed was quite often up to the person doing the censoring – this, among
other  things,  encouraged the  culture of  self-censorship.268 The fear  of  confronting political  and
economic powers, being subjected to legal threats or pressure from the armed forces, and the culture
of media authoritarianism all contribute to the lack if inquisitive journalism in Chile.269
As a more commonplace reason for self-censorship is the hierarchical structure of newsroom
in  Chile.  Surprisingly,  Castillo  has  argued  that  the  authoritarian  command  in  the  workplace
accentuated during the transition, and compares the newsroom to the ranch: the journalist in this
comparison is in the role of a peasant, while the editor takes the role of an omnipotent landowner. 270
As the  competition  is  tough and the press  landscape  in  Chile  is  not  outstandingly diverse,  the
journalists are keen to hold on their jobs and subdue to the prevailing system. Authors differ in their
opinions on how restricted the journalists really are in Chile, but Castillo has flatly claimed that “in
a hierarchical chain of command, editors receive instructions from the media owners, who then
instruct journalists about the news agenda, news framing and even the sources that they should
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consult.”271 In any case, it is clear that there are several impediments in place that complicate the
unbiased news and story reporting. For many, self-censorship seems less harmful than challenging
the entire newsroom culture. 
In conclusion, the development of post-authoritarian media system in Chile represented both
in content and in its mode of operation have been heavily constrained by the legacies of Pinochet’s
regime. The potential for a democratic media has been cut short by the new democratic authorities,
who have prioritised consensus and neoliberal economic policies over a substantially pluralistic and
inclusive media system; the political elites, highly sensitive of any criticism towards themselves,
have contributed to the demise of independent media. Furthermore, the duopoly of El Mercurio S.A
and Copesa in the press remained unbroken during the transition, and the television landscape was
taken over by commercial imperatives and foreign media conglomerates. New independent media
outlets started to appear after a period of draught, making an important but not an overly influential
contribution to the pluralisation of Chilean media. Equally,  TVN has attempted to diversify the
television  programming  available  to  the  Chilean  public,  but  has  not  been  able  to  balance  the
prevalent commercial broadcasting. The Chilean media system, thus, during suffered from lack of
state support and due to the market imperatives, was unable to serve as a functional public sphere
institution. 
4. Estonian and Chilean Media in Comparative Perspectives
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the media developments in Estonia and in Chile as outlined
in the second and third chapter in a comparative perspective, and articulate it within the theoretical
framework established in  the  first  chapter.  The  present  chapter  first  reviews  the  functions  and
operations of the mass media during the period preceding the regime change. It then proceeds to
addressing the media under democratic rule, and aims to identify certain differences and similarities
in the media system development in Estonia and in Chile. The third section addresses the question
of the media and journalistic culture after the institution of democracy, and reviews the successes
and downfalls of these developments. Throughout the chapter, the comparison is paralleled with the
analysis of the media performance as a public sphere institution in Estonia and in Chile. 
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The starting point for the comparison of the media development and the media as a public
sphere institution in Estonia and in Chile is the identification of the central transition narrative, that
of continuity versus change. Indeed, certain continuities of the past are present both in Estonia and
in Chile – the discrepancy in speed of cultural and institutional changes was briefly discussed in the
first chapter272 – but rather, what is meant here by the persistence of authoritarian legacy concerns
the  attitude  adopted  by  the  prevailing  elites  in  dealing  with  the  collective  experiences  and
institutional designs of the past. As discussed in the previous chapter, the most important feature of
Chilean transition was that it did not constitute a clean break with the authoritarian regime. The
bigger part of the military, political, and economic elite that had risen under Pinochet, continuously
retained their importance in the post-authoritarian Chile. In the case of Estonia, a generalisation can
be made that the imperative was to move as far away from the past as quickly as possible – this is
illustrated by the disappearance of Soviet elites from the public life, the rapid emergence of new
elites and the “bitter pill” reform strategy chosen by the new government. While Chile still has an
ambiguous relationship with its past, Estonian approach has been quite unequivocal. 
4.1 Agents for Change: Official Media vs Alternative Media
As outlined in the second and the third chapter, the media both in Estonia and in Chile had a notable
role to play in the society prior to the change in political regime. In Estonia, the official media itself
begun to embody some of the qualities of a public sphere institution, while in Chile, the alternative
media had developed remarkably under Pinochet’s rule. The operations of the media, however, were
distinguishably different in the two countries and had accordingly a different impact on the ensuing
political  development.  This  section will  trace  the modes of  operation  and the  relevance  of  the
agencies  furthered  by  the  media  in  the  two  countries  politically,  and  will  offer  one  possible
explanation to why the impact of the media, in pushing for democracy, differed in Estonia and in
Chile a great deal. 
During the period of Pinochet's rule, a “purist approach towards liberalisation” was adopted,
with no attention paid to social issues, and the military regime was built around the concept of a
limited state, “only concerned with defence, law and order and administrative function”.273 There
was no noteworthy attempt by the regime to create new authoritarian institutions – the desired result
was achieved by “distorting rather than disbanding basic institutions of political democracy”.274 This
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approach was taken with the media organisations as well – instead of creating new media outlets
faithful to the regime, the new political elite aimed to secure the loyalty of the already existing
media.  Private  control  and  commercial  mode  of  operation  are  characteristic  features  of  Latin
American media system. Instead of taking control of the media organisations, the regimes have used
measures such as routine shut-downs, censorship of newspapers and persecution of journalists;275
state control of resources, such as advertising, tax imports, news print, and broadcasting licences
has also been common.276 
After the military coup in 1973, the media system was subdued not only to pro-military
censorship, but also to a new, neoliberal market ideology. The economic model applied in Chile was
put together by a group of Chilean economists, known as The Chicago boys. They were convinced
that the economy of Chile “had been suffocated by an extremely interventionist welfare state and
hoped to replace it with an ultra-liberal free market model.”277 This approach fit well with the main
objective of the media policy of the regime, which was to eliminate spaces of political dialogue and
debate,278 and to create a demobilised and disinterested populace. By cutting state funding, imposing
censorship, and replacing educational and cultural programming on television with entertainment,
the dictatorship was rather successful at this task. By the time the first signs of political opening
appeared, the dynamics of the Chilean media system was consolidated in their authoritarian form.
El Mercurio S.A and Copesa papers and television were loyal mouthpieces to the regime, while the
alternative outlets struggled to offer critical approaches to a limited public. The alternative media
sphere went along with the opening, but the regime-friendly media continued as usual: even if the
official media could have started to include sensitive issues and more objective reporting in their
content, they decided not to do so. 
The bigger part of the reason why the media’s role during the initial transition in Chile was
arguably small, comes down to the identities of the primary agents for change.279 As discussed, the
transition in Chile was a case of accommodation between the military elites and the pro-democratic
forces. As a negotiated exit it did not stem from a collapse of the previous regime as in Estonia – it
was  “brought  about  through a  series  of  pacts  (…) between  opposition  politicians  and military
officials.”280 The civic society, which had been a key factor in the mobilisation for mass protests
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between 1983 and 1986, was later neutralised by the Concertacion coalition.281 The oppositional
elites abandoned the popular mobilising strategy282 after it became clear that the only way to change
the political system was to work with the incumbent elites. Thus, the mass mobilisation role of the
media  in  Chile  was  remarkably  smaller  than  in  Estonia.  Instead,  the  alternative  media  largely
focused on the  human rights  abuses  – that  in  itself  constituted  an act  of  resistance in  Chilean
conditions.  The  “extreme  suddenness  and  violence  of  the  coup”283 after  the  experiment  with
socialist government roused continuous international attention. For many human rights groups and
alternative media outlets receiving foreign funding, addressing the atrocities of the regime was the
most  efficient  way  to  bring  awareness  and  evoke  international  condemnation  of  the  Pinochet
regime. 
In Estonia, an alternative media sphere did not emerge during the Soviet period, but the
relaxing censorship following the political opening allowed the official media to fulfil the void of
space for public discussion of both the experiences of the past and alternatives for the future. The
political developments and the media were inextricably intertwined. Characteristic to Estonian pre-
independence  movements  was  that  non-political  organisations,  such  as  the  Cultural  Heritage
Society, became politicised, and the intellectuals became involved in politics. The media gained an
especially  important  role  in  furthering  change  as  journalists  themselves  became  advocates  for
democracy.284 By 1989 the Communist Party in Estonia had not only lost control of the chain of
events, but also their presentation in the media, as the Estonian-language outlets carried the views
of  the  opposition  –  the  Popular  Front  and the  Citizens’ Committees.285 The  group  of  activists
advocating for democracy on the streets, in the media and within institutions overlapped a great
deal. The capability of the mass media was demonstrated by the organisation of the Baltic Way in
1989 with  the  help  of  radio,  and during  the  August  Coup in  1991,  the  media  organised  mass
resistance.286 
The opposition in Chile had no such leverage. In Estonia, what got covered in the media was
dependent on the allowances the Soviet authorities were willing, and later, forced to make; in Chile,
more than anything else, the local elite owning the official media not unwillingly aligned with the
ideology promoted by the military government. That is, the division between “us” and “them”, the
oppressors  and  the  oppressed,  was  easy  to  make  in  Estonia.  The  Soviet  powers  were  nearly
281 Castillo, “Media in Chilean Transition,” 139
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universally seen, among Estonians, as the foreign enemy seeking to implement full institutional and
ideological control over occupied nations. The Chilean elite during the dictatorship were not foreign
occupiers but Chileans themselves, whose opportunism-driven motives prompted them to turn a
blind eye to the seamy side of the system they were contributing to. Thus, the polarisation of the
society into supporters and challengers of the regime in Chile followed the lines of ideological
identification, rather than constitutive difference and incompatibility of the social groups sustaining
and hollowing out the regime. The continuous presence of the old elites in post-authoritarian Chile
have  made  a  substantial  contribution  to  the  culture  of  “bad  memory”.287 The  complexity  of
addressing the past while the leaders of the past are still present in society, has led to the path of
least resistance – not dealing with the bygone era at all. 
4. 2 Media, Democracy, and the Neoliberal Marketplace
Lance Bennett, reflecting on the post-Communist transitions, has deemed that “the occurrence of
the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe suggests that free media systems are much better at
bringing  down  authoritarian  regimes  than  they  are  at  later  sustaining  stable,  participatory
democracies.”288 Przeworski has equally spoken of Henry Kissinger’s domino effect in relation to
the fall of communism – the developments in one country inspired people in another to update their
probability of success, and the more countries “went over brink”, the more others felt assured in
their own success.289 Accommodating these ideas to fit both Estonia and Chile, one could argue that
the liberalisation phase in transition generally cultivates a degree of euphoria, as people claim more
and more previously prohibited ground – it  is easier for the media to serve as a public sphere
institution  in  conditions  where  the  public  interest  is  high  and  the  common  cause  is  easily
identifiable.  Castillo  points  out  that  the  alternative  media  in  Chile  was  left  without  a  “natural
enemy” after the change of authorities;290 similarly, the public enthusiasm ceased substantially over
time in Estonia, after democracy had been instituted. 
Lauristin, Vihalemm, and Tallo have outlined three phases of the development of political
culture: the mythological, the ideological, and the critical-rational phase.291 The mythological phase
coincides with the liberalisation period under an authoritarian regime of “emotional devotion, rather
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than rational deliberation”; the ideological phase is characterised by strong polarisation between
parties,  the  mythological  symbolism  being  replaced  with  “key  words  characterising  political
ideologies”.292 The critical-rational stage constitutes a “true democratic political culture”, with “firm
ties between political discourse and political practice”, and the discourse itself “becomes problem-
solving and reflexive in character”.293 The critical-rational stage coincides with the main qualities of
the  public  sphere  as  described  by  Habermas,  given  that  the  main  purpose  of  political
communication in this phase is rational deliberation in an inclusive, democratic manner. This stage
has also been described to be the most difficult to reach – indeed, if one agrees with Habermas'
approach to the contemporary developments of the public sphere, then in its perfect form perhaps
impossible. The mythological phase, however, ended in Estonia with the gaining of independence
and the reality of rapid reform strategy; in Chile, to the extent that it existed in the first place, the
end of dictatorship had a similar effect on the alternative media sphere.
It seems fair to argue that during the period this thesis focuses on, neither Estonia nor Chile
reached the critical-rational stage in the public sphere and political culture development, and to the
extent  that  it  is  reflected  in  the  media,  in  the  communication  sphere.  Socialisation  and  re-
socialisation have been identified as the main function of the media during periods of rapid social
change294,  such  as  institution  of  a  new political  regime.  However,  the  neoliberal  transition,  as
described, has its own effects on the media. As a result of extensive marketisation, Dahlgren has
identified  the  process  of  corporate  values,  such  as  “winning,  efficiency,  calculability,  and
profitability” pushing out democratic values in a society.295 He calls this phenomenon “economism”,
defined  as  “asserting  the  priority  of  economic  criteria  over  all  other  values  or  modes of
reasoning.”296 
That  coincides  with  Habermas's  criticism  of  non-economic  areas  being  “colonised”  by
economist patterns297, such as the media imperatives changing from public service to profit-seeking.
If these two concepts, the objective of socialisation and the dispersion of economism, are brought
together  with  the  ideological-political  nature  of  political  communication  during  the  ideological
phase,  the  picture  turns  increasingly  complex.  However,  as  there  are  many  different  factors
concurrently at work in countries going through both democratisation and the institution (in the case
of  Chile,  consolidation)  of  capitalism,  these  variables  perhaps  offer  one  possible  approach  to
understanding the media developments both in Estonia and Chile. 
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The main conclusion that can be made based on the information provided in the second and
the third chapter is that the market forces are one of the biggest, perhaps the main factor meddling
with the media’s potential as a public sphere institution. Estonia initially experienced a boom in the
press market after capitalism was adopted; however, both in Estonia and in Chile the press suffered
considerable losses due to the same market-centric policies that had initially allowed unprecedented
freedom.  The  politicised  advertising  forced  alternative  media  in  Chile  out  of  business,  and  in
Estonia, many new papers and magazines closed when the aftershock of the rapid reform strategy
was  experienced.  Furthermore,  the  press,  subjugated  to  the  need  to  compete  for  advertising
revenues, went through a dramatic commercialisation in Estonia, and furthered the process in Chile.
The tabloids SL Õhtuleht in Estonia, La Tercera and Las Ultimas Noticias in Chile leading
the market by the end of 1990s and early 2000s, is a clear sign of both the change in the public
preference of entertainment over serious news reporting, and of the profit orientation overriding
other  objectives,  such  as  public  participation  and  civic  education.  The  media  market  in  both
countries clearly shows the applicability of the theory of public sphere's function diminishing in the
media  when  placed  in  unregulated  market  conditions,  as  has  been  argued  by  Habermas  and
Jakubowicz. It is interesting to note that the consolidation of the media had led by the end of 1990s
to the press market being dominated by two media organisations in both countries: in Estonia, these
were AS Ekspress Grupp and Eesti Meedia AS; in Chile, El Mercurio S.A and Copesa. 
The tendencies in television development were similar as well: both countries experienced
consolidation  of  the  market,  foreign  interest  penetration  and eventually,  foreign  ownership  and
domination of the television broadcasting. Perhaps the developments in the television market were
even  more  similar  than  in  the  press,  as  in  both  countries,  the  television  constituted  the  most
important and controlled medium for the authoritarian elites. After the change of government, both
television systems went through rapid changes. Estonia, with its single national channel until 1993,
was diversified by nine new operators, that after mergers and bankruptcies were narrowed down to
three – ETV, Kanal 2, and TV 3. In Chile, the traditional system of university control was toppled
because of the need to compete for advertising revenues: Channel 11 was taken over by foreign
ownership, and new commercial channels such as La Red entered the market, further consolidating
the position of large media conglomerates in Chile. By the end of the 1990s, Estonian and Chilean
television systems were for the most part operated by foreign companies. 
Changes in television content, again, clearly indicate commercialisation. In both countries,
imported programming and the US-style shows formed the bigger part of television programming
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on commercial channels. As Shein has argued about Estonia298, and Fuenzalida about Chile299, the
social and economic difficulties experienced by the populations pushed them towards preferring
entertaining  content  over  social  and  educational  –  the  harmless  escapism  that  television
programming was able to offer proved more effective as a distraction from everyday troubles than
educational content. The only alternatives, ETV in Estonia and TVN in Chile, have both struggled
throughout the 1990s for their survival. While the continuous existence of PSB shows that public
service broadcasting is still valued, their existence has been threatened in Estonia by the distaste for
state intervention, and in Chile, by the fear among the right wing economic elite that TVN will
undermine  other  ideologically  right  wing  television  channels.  While  ETV  in  Estonia,  quite
remarkably, did manage to outpace commercial channels in audience share until the end of 1990s,
the TVN in Chile plays a more marginal role. 
Conclusively,  the  press  indicates  some  continuity  and  revival  of  the  public  sphere  and
political culture. Coinciding with the ideological phase of political culture and market orientation
causing “economism”, however, the new Estonian press in 1990s was heavily inclined towards the
rhetoric of liberalism, the new generation of “winners” in Estonian society and progressiveness. The
dominating Chilean press can be conceptualised on the same lines as well:  in addition to the right
wing  bias  in  Chilean  media,  the  content  according  to  one  study  includes  stories  40%  on
government, 12% on members of judiciary, 9% on politicians, 30% on middle class and armed
forces,  and less  than  10% on the  largest  social  class  –  the  urban poor,  working class  and the
indigenous people.300 The success-centrality characterises  the  dominant  media in  1990s in  both
countries. On the other hand, the Estonian media have taken their independence from authorities
very seriously – the journalistic  culture will  be the topic of  the next  section.  In  Chile,  the re-
emergence of alternative media have also contributed to the development of political culture and the
public  sphere.  Concerning  television,  it  is  hard  to  conceptualise  the  commercial  channels  as
portraying inclusiveness and the public sphere; ETV and TVN, however, aim towards that direction.
4.3 Media and Journalistic Culture
The ability of the media to perform their role as a public sphere institution among other things
depends  on  the  performance  of  the  people  creating  the  media  content,  the  journalists;  their
performance, in turn, is closely related to the journalistic and media culture in a society. As in many
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other aspects, the change of authorities in Chile did not begin the development of a completely new
journalistic culture; rather, Chilean media culture has been defined by the legacies of the past and
institutional  structures  that  were  still  in  place  after  ten  years  of  democratic  rule,  distinctively
authoritarian in their character. In the case of Chile, the central question has been not how to build a
new media culture, but how to restructure the one already in existence. In Estonia, however, the set
Soviet journalistic model was inadequate for the needs of a democratic society, and the task of
discovering, or rediscovering, the principles of a democratic media culture lie ahead. 
Some of the works analysing Estonian media performance written in the early and mid-
1990s are perhaps overly optimistic in hailing the Estonian media’s unbiased operations, political
objectivity, and the valuing of journalistic mission. The later accounts give a more sober evaluation.
The general desire to develop towards the West is very noticeable in the journalistic objectives and
practices implied. Epp Lauk, discussing Estonian media development, has argued that the vision for
the future in Estonia for the media constituted the “Europeanisation” – that includes reporting on
EU  issues  with  the  objective  of  laying  grounds  for  “constituting  a  common  European  public
sphere”, and “application of standards, values, and principles generally agreed upon in so-called
Western journalism”.301 This “liberal”  model  of journalism that the Estonian media has tried to
adopt  is  based  on “participatory democracy”  and principles  of  “separation  of  powers,  political
freedom, transparency and accountability.”302 For the democratic values permeating the society are a
prerequisite for such a media system, she also points out that the Western journalistic principles
cannot be “implanted like some sort of a preventive injection.”303
The fact that these principles do not take root by themselves is illustrated by the problem of
lack  of  professionalism in  Estonian  media  in  the  1990s,  leading  to  the  process  of  democratic
“watchdogs” turning into “hunting dogs” for political scandal and marketable content, explained in
the  second  chapter.304 The  “liberal”  journalism  model,  however,  requires  a  degree  of
professionalism. Epp Lauk, trying to answer the question of why was the switch from the Soviet
style journalism to the Western “liberal” model so difficult, points to Marc Howard’s argumentation
that  there are three necessary factors that  can guarantee a lasting societal  change – “first,  new
institutions must be authoritative and binding; second, they should build upon existing traditions
and culture; and third, several decades and generations are needed to change people’s habits and
acculturation so that the societal change is decisive and enduring.”305 The anticlimactic answer to
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this problem might as well  be that what Estonian journalistic culture needed was more time to
develop; from the public sphere perspective, however, it could be argued that the time factor matters
little if the media imperatives of profit-seeking do not change. 
The revision of Chilean post-authoritarian journalistic culture tends to lead back to the issue
of self-censorship. According to Sorensen, “by the end of the dictatorship in 1990, over 3000 people
had been killed or disappeared, hundreds had been tortured, and an estimated 200,000 Chileans
were living abroad in  exile.”306 These experiences  led Sorensen to  discuss the “post-traumatic”
factors as one of the reasons, in addition to the economic and state pressures, that led to the demise
of alternative media in post-authoritarian Chile. She argues that the repressions had traumatised
many journalists to the extent that they no longer had any interest in reporting on controversial and
sensitive issues.307 As discussed in the context of hierarchical newsroom structure in Chile in the
third chapter, the journalists did not enjoy job security. As the positions were scarce, replacements
were easy to find.308 The highly controlled, hierarchical chain of power in journalism continued well
into the transition period, further deepening the culture of self-censorship and “bad memory”. 
As an example of continuous persecution of journalists and an illustration that the culture of
self-censorship was not only a problem of subjective fear,  Castillo has outlined a few cases of
journalists being subject to repressions in the 1990s after publishing on sensitive issues in Chilean
society.  One of such was Francisco Martorell’s  book,  Diplomatic  Impunity,  which caused great
furore, causing Martorell to leave Chile and live in exile – even in a namely democratic system,
critical assessment of the past experiences and the current corruption in the ranks of the right-wing
supporters resulted in grave punishments. The other infamous case was that of Alejandra Matus and
The Black  Book of  Chilean Justice. According to  Castillo,  these  cases  became the  symbols  of
“paradoxes and frustrations experienced by the Chilean journalists and the media in the democratic
transition”, which had seemingly offered so much to the journalists in term of freedom of speech
and of the press, of expression, and the media plurality.309 These cases also became an international
embarrassment  for  the  government  that  had  assumed  to  power  under  the  flag  of  representing
democracy.
In  comparison,  Estonian  journalistic  culture  in  the  1990s  struggled  with  the  attempt  to
implement Western journalistic culture, which was constrained by the lack of experience with the
watchdog and  self-regulatory model  of  journalism.  Journalists  were  simultaneously subdued to
commercialisation accompanying the institution of market economy in Estonia, and the following
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requirement to provide entertaining, audience-attracting content, while morally aspiring towards the
critical-analytical, watchdog type of journalism. Claudia Mellado and Arjen Van Dalen propose that
in societies with a higher level of political competition, the media polarises and the development of
a  pluralist,  critical  press  is  more  likely  to  happen.310 In  contrast,  the  political  competition  in
transitional Chile has been minimal, which according to Mellado's and Van Dalen leads to a less
critical  press.  Partially  due  to  the  high  level  of  consent  among  the  political  elite  that  did  not
encourage  a  critical  press,  and  partially  in  relation  to  the  institutional,  legal,  and  behavioural
legacies of the dictatorship, the media developments have led to the formally unified but inherently
repressed  culture  of  journalism  in  Chile.  As  discussed,  this  is  mainly  expressed  in  the  self-
censorship of content and the hierarchical chain of command in the newsroom.
Although Estonian press in the 1990s developed in conditions free of political ideology (but
not  of  economic  ideology),  the  idea  that  “a  high  ranking for  press  freedom is  not  necessarily
accompanied  with  high-quality  journalism  and  responsible  performance”311 is  confirmed  by
Estonian experience. That is to say, the comparison of Estonian and Chilean developments clearly
mark that the freedom of the press is a crucial preliminary requirement of a full-fledged public
sphere oriented media providing high quality content, but does not bring such a media system into
existence  by  itself.  Following  Hallin  and  Mancini’s  argumentation,  “the  cultural  basis  for
professionalisation is weaker where the political culture allows particular interest over the general
public  good”,312 which aligns  with Habermas's  theory of  economic interests  “refeudalising” the
media sphere as a public sphere institution, leading to the demise of the public interest in the media.
Both  in  Estonia  and  in  Chile,  the  public  sphere  potential  germinated  under  the  authoritarian
regimes, but struggled to grow in the commercial, and in the case of Chile, legally and culturally
restricting conditions. It can be justly reasoned, then, that the Estonian and Chilean media processes
have confirmed that the free market conditions, if combined with the “economism” proposed by
Dahlgren, result in an impoverished public sphere performance of the media. 
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Conclusion 
The extraordinary monopoly Agustin Edwards as the owner of El Mercurio had on the awareness of
the Chilean population exemplifies how the media not only designates which issues are salient in
the public consciousness, but in concentrated media markets, determines what basic information
concerning any issue is available for deliberation at all. The provision of information, thus, is never
simply a matter of profit-oriented business responding to the demands of the market, as has been
argued in support of neoliberal principles. If it were, the imperative of authoritarian rulers to control
all means of communication would seem senseless. The market-centric definition of the media not
only downplays  the importance of social  and educational  media content,  but deems the central
democratic principles of active and conscious participation irrelevant. 
The Habermasian theory of the media's public sphere function highlights deliberation and
discussion as a result of processing the information available as the essence of media's importance.
Following the founding principles of democracy – participation and contestation – the open access
and public debate rising from issues relevant to the public in the media, if serving as a public sphere
institution, make Habermas' approach a pertinent way to conceptualise media. It is assumed that the
media has a larger purpose in a society beyond fact-reporting and entertainment. The Western model
of  journalism generally  aligns  in  its  ideals  with  the  theory  of   Habermas,  in  underlining  the
independent  watchdog  role  and  objective  reporting  functions,  and  serving  the  society.  The
expectations in both Estonia and Chile, as countries moving on from an authoritarian past, was to
develop in that direction. 
The practice has proved very much different, despite the promising beginning of the media
developments during the final years of authoritarian rule in both countries. The educational purpose,
concerning both addressing the past and discussing the present, was actively realised at the time – in
Chile, more in print than in television, while in Estonia, both mediums played an important role. In
Estonia, the deliberation grew into planning and action, that is, mass mobilisation, while Chilean
media's role remained marginal. The starting points for the subsequent media developments were
determined by the mode of transitions to democracy. In Estonia, already in the beginning of the
democratic regime, the media had a certain heroic nimbus due to the fact that Estonian regime
change  had stemmed from the  collapse  of  the  previous  one,  to  which  the  media  had  actively
contributed. As the democracy in Chile was a product of negotiation, the opposition, turned into
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new authorities, rather disfavoured the power of the media to tip the scale and ruin the delicate
balance of post-authoritarian political consensus. 
More than anything else, the direction of media developments both in Estonia and in Chile
has been set by the neoliberal market conditions the media outlets were left to survive in. The public
sphere function role of the media, while continuously valued, was overridden by more pressing
objectives. In Estonia, the general distaste for state intervention after the Soviet regime did not
favour the critical state support for the media to retain their independence from advertisers, while in
Chile, the authorities preferred a limping media system over a democratic but critical contestant.
The processes of media development in both countries are to an extent externally similar. The press
market became dominated by tabloids, the circulation of cultural and educational outlets declined
and the ownership concentrated into the hands of large media organisations. Television audience in
both  countries  surpassed  the  readership  of  the  press.  The orientation  of  the  programming was
moulded to attract large viewership, in order to receive higher advertising revenues, and by the end
of the 1990s, the television market in both countries was dominated by foreign owners and imported
content. 
In a strikingly short period, the public sphere role of the media degenerated from high public
interest in the late 1980s to highly questionable by the mid-1990s in both countries. It makes sense
to argue that the restrictions posed by the authorities and the legal system in Chile after the end of
the dictatorship played a small role, as these were a continuation of the past conditions, and a viable
alternative  media  had  been  able  to  flourish  under  Pinochet  despite  them.  Considering  the
similarities in the tendencies of media developments in Estonia and Chile, and the similar economic
ideology, it is clear that the biggest reason for the demise of the public service function of the media
in  both  countries  was  the  neoliberal  economic  ideology.  As  the  countries  adjusted  to  new
conditions, there were signs of public sphere's revival in the media in the final years of 1990s and
early 2000s, with sensitive but publicly relative issues entering the debate and new, independent and
analytical media outlets being founded, such as The Clinic in Chile. The state-subsidised television
also managed to carry on that role. 
Overall,  relying  on  the  experiences  of  Estonian  and  Chile  as  countries  in  democratic
transition throughout the 1990s, it is concluded that the mass media's capability to serve as a public
sphere  institution  declines  with  market  imperatives  entering  the  stage,  as  has  been  argued  by
Habermas. However, that does not imply that the media loses its inherent potential to serve the
public interest, but rather that for the public sphere function to continue, simply eliminating any
kind of restriction, legal or ideological, does not give way to the development of democratic media.
While the neoliberal economy ostensibly emancipates the media ideologically, it chains them back
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down economically. Supporting investigative and critical-analytical journalism might indeed seem
as a contradictory move by the state, as the critical and deliberative approach it would encourage
inevitably would turn against themselves as well,  but if  a true democracy is  the objective,  that
seems  to  be  the  only reasonable  way to  proceed.  A democratic  and  self-regulatory  culture  of
journalism requires a strong democratic culture in the society, which, in turn, can be encouraged by
the media. As exemplified by the experience of Estonia and Chile, the media as a public sphere
institution and the development of substantive democracy are in a constitutive symbiosis. 
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Summary in Estonian
Meedia roll ülemineku protsessis demokraatiale Eesti ja Tšiili näitel 
Eesti  ja  Tšiili  kui  kahe  väga  erineva  riigi  vahel  leidub  ajalooline  sarnasus,  milleks  on
liberaliseerumise  protsessi  algus  1980.  aastate  lõpul  ja  üleminek  demokraatiale  1990.  aastate
jooksul. Lisaks ajalisele paralleelile sarnanesid ka nende riikide majanduslikud taktikad – nii Eesti
kui Tšiili otsustasid pärast autoritaarse režiimi lõppu neoliberalistliku lähenemise kasuks, Tšiili juba
töös oleva süsteemi jätkamise ja Eesti uue majandusliku strateegia valimisel. Töös väidetakse, et
meedial oli mõlemas riigis roll autoritaarse režiimi õõnestamises ja/või kukutamises, ning meedia
ülesandena  nähakse,  lisaks  muule,  avalike  huvide  teenimist.  Töös  käsitletakse  perioodi  1980.
aastate lõpust sajandivahetuseni. 
Töö  eesmärgiks  on  uurida,  milline  oli  meedia  roll  ülemineku  protsessis  autoritaarselt  režiimilt
demokraatiale Eestis ja Tšiilis, ja millest tuleneb seaduspärasus, et demokraatlikus ühiskonnas ei vii
arengud tingimata  demokraatliku  meediasüsteemini,  ehkki  taoline  tulem näib  loogiline.  Keskne
idee, millest töös meediakäsitluses lähtutakse, on Jürgen Habermase avaliku sfääri teooria. Meediat
käsitletakse kui avaliku sfääri institutsiooni, millel on potentsiaal ühendada ühiskonda ning luua
demokraatliku  kvaliteeti  osaluse,  arutelu  ja  poliitilise  kommunikatsiooni  kaudu.  Seetõttu
keskendutakse töös trükimeediale ja televisioonile kui meediumitele, mis on nii Eestis kui Tšiilis
sellest perspektiivist lähtudes olnud kõige olulisemad. 
Töö esimene peatükk keskendub üleminekuprotsessi, meedia ja demokraatia teoreetilise raamistiku
paikapanemisele.  Järgmises  kahes  peatükis  vaadeldakse  meediaprotsesse  Eestis  ja  Tšiilis:
käsitletakse  muutusi  väljaannete  rohkuses,  sisus,  omandivormides,  välismaise  kapitali  ja  mõju
kohalolus ning inimeste tarbimisharjumustes. Erilist tähelepanu pööratakse neoliberaalse majanduse
toimimismehhanismide mõjule meedia töös ja toodangus. 1980. aastate lõpul autoritaarse võimu all
võttis meedia mõlemas riigis suuremal või vähemalt määral enda kanda opositsiooni rolli. Meedia
toimis sel perioodil, nii palju kui see piirangute tõttu võimalik oli, kriitilise-analüütilise ja rahvast
mobiliseeriva institutsioonina, pakkudes publikule võimalust osalemiseks ja autoritaarse mineviku
kogemuste mõtestamiseks. Kui Eestis sai võrdlemisi avalik diskussioon võimalikuks ka ametlikus
ehk riigi kontrollitavas meedias, siis Tšiilis väljendus avaliku sfääri potentsiaal alternatiivse meedia
sfääris. 
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Võimuvahetuse  järgse  kümnendi  meediaprotsesse  vaadeldes  ilmneb,  et  meedia  avaliku  sfääri
funktsioon  selliselt,  nagu  Habermas  seda  mõtestab,  vähenes  märkimisväärselt.  Ühelt  poolt  on
võimalik seda seletada igati ootuspärase huvi langusega poliitiliste ja ühiskondlike protsesside vastu
pärast seda, kui võimuvahetuse keeruline etapp jääb seljataha. Teisalt on nähtav ilmselge paralleel
turumajanduse kehtestamise, kinnistumise ja avaliku sfääri taandarengu vahel meedias. Mõlemas
riigis  kümnendi  kulgedes  muutus  meedia  edastatav  sisu  järjest  enam  meelelahutuslikuks  ja
haridusliku  või  kaasava  eesmärgi  mõttes  väheväärtuslikuks.  Kultuuriväljaannete  arv  ja  ringlus
vähenes, samas kui kollane ajakirjandus ja kommertstelevisioon populariseerus. Meedia väljaanded
ja televisioon koondus järjest enam suurärimeeste kätte, ning meedia organisatsioonide peamiseks
sihiks sai tulu teenimise eesmärgil ligi tõmmata võimalikult palju reklaamipakkujaid. 
Meedia  kommertsialiseerumisel  on  ka  teisi  põhjusi.  Eesti  arenguid  selgitab  osaliselt  vähene  ja
ajaliselt kauge kogemus demokraatliku meediaga – pärast iseseisvumist nähti eesmärgina lääneliku
meediasüsteemi  välja  arendamist,  kus  ajakirjandusel  on  poliitika  üle  arutlev  ja  riigis  toimuvat
kriitiliselt  analüüsiv  funktsioon.  Samas  toimib  taoline  süsteem  ainult  siis,  kui  demokraatlikud
väärtused on ühiskonnas kinnistunud. Tšiili olukorra tegi 1990ndatel ja ka edasipidi keeruliseks
tõsiasi,  et  autoritaarne  režiim  oli  suutnud  endast  maha  jätta  küllalt  püsivad  institutsionaalsed
piirangud,  millest  uuel  poliitilisel  eliidil  ei  olnud võimalik niisama lihtsalt  vabaneda.  Tšiilis  oli
vägivaldne autoritaarne režiim tekitanud olukorra, kus ka hilisemates demokraatlikumates oludes
eelistasid paljud ajakirjanikud – paremate  võimaluste  puudumisel,  töö  säilitamise  eesmärgil  või
vähesest  ühiskondlikust  missioonitundest  –  pigistada  mineviku  kogemuste  osas  silma  kinni  ja
kirjutada vähem konfliktsetel teemadel.
Antud arenguid ja mõjusid arvesse võttes järeldatakse töös, et meedial on suur potentsiaal aidata
luua demokraatlikumat ühiskonda, kuid mitmete piiravate ja kurnavate faktorite tõttu see potentsiaal
alati ei teostu. Olukorras, kus ühiskond on tugevalt polariseerunud ja “meie-nemad” jaotus on väga
selge, nii nagu võimuvahetuse eelsel perioodil Eestis ja Tšiilis, on meedial ka lihtsam kõrgendatud
publiku  huvi  tõttu  täita  avaliku  sfääri  institutsiooni  rolli.  Analüüsist  järeldub,  et  pressi-  ja
sõnavabadus  iseeneses  ei  taga  demokraatliku  meediasüsteemi  arengut,  eriti  sellisel  juhul,  kui
meediaorganisatsioonid sõltuvad täielikult turul valitsevast olukordast, vaatajate-lugejate hulgast ja
reklaamituludest.  Üks  võimalus  olukorda  parandada  on  riiklikul  tasemel  panustada  kas
seadusandluse või rahastamise kaudu, nii nagu seda tehakse avalik-õigusliku ringhäälingu puhul.
On selge, et elujõuline meedia on demokraatlikus ühiskonnas äärmiselt vajalik. 
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